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A b st r a c t
A n Overview o f Local, State and Federal Regulations Imposed Upon 
Political Advertising discusses the 1991 policy revisions enacted by the Federal 
Communications Commission that effect political advertising. In addition, 
considerable attention is devoted to how the judicial system has treated cases 
dealing with a variety of political advertising issues ranging from the posting 
of campaign signs to assuring that proper sponsorship identification appears on 
campaign materials.
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CHAPTER 1
In t r o d u c t io n
What a difference a hundred years make, for, in just a little over a 
century, the essence of political advertising has evolved from campaign speeches 
on tree stumps to the sophisticated media-dominated political advertising to 
which we are so accustomed today.
The presidential election of 1840, which pitted Martin Van Buren against 
William Henry Harrison, was significant in that it marked the first campaign 
that showcased the use of "image” advertising (Jamieson 1992). The intent of 
image advertising is to link popular symbols—such as the Constitution, bald 
eagle, or Lady Liberty—to the candidate (Jamieson 1992). Harrison successfully 
associated himself with a log cabin and hard cider, which had the effect of 
transforming the son of a wealthy governor into a modest, hardworking farmer 
and backwoodsman Qamieson 1992).
The most common form of political advertising during the 1840 election 
was “word-of-mouth.” Another important contribution that arose out of that 
political contest was the use of the direct appeal (Jamieson 1992).
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The direct appeal allowed the candidate the opportunity to speak publicly on 
his own behalf and in his own defense (Jamieson 1992). But, these refutations 
of the candidate’s character were limited, as it was not until 1912 that the 
presidential candidate was accepted as an active campaigner and an advocate of 
his own cause Qamieson 1992). Prior to 1912, the traditional campaign protocol 
was for the candidate to deliver a speech of thanks after being notified of the 
party’s nomination. Aside from writing a letter stipulating the precise aspects 
of the party platform on which he would run, the candidate was silent until the 
election results were announced (Jamieson 1992).
While William Jennings Bryan pioneered the modern campaign in 1896 
by giving several impassioned speeches across the country advocating his 
candidacy, it was not until 1928 that a revolution occurred in the realm of 
political communication: The creation of a national audience via the radio 
(Jamieson 1992). The radio offered candidates the ability both to speak to huge 
audiences and to position political messages into specific time boundaries 
(Jamieson 1992). Because it was essentially impossible to measure the impact of 
a given message on an invisible audience, campaigns began to rely on the use of 
polls conducted to chart audience predispositions and responses (Jamieson 1992).
The duration of the political speech witnessed a dramatic decline, since 
candidates were charged the standard commercial rates for radio air time 
(Jamieson 1992). In 1928, the average amount of time purchased by candidates
was one hour, as opposed to 1980 when the typical message ran only thirty 
seconds Qamieson 1992).
Newsreels emerged side by side with radio Qamieson 1992). In fact, the 
newsreel was, in many respects, the predecessor of today’s televised political 
advertisement Qamieson 1992). The newsreel technology made it possible for 
partisan films to be distributed through the established newsreel channels 
Qamieson 1992). In 1948, Truman’s documentary newsreel may have proven 
to be the difference in his ultimate narrow victory over Dewey Qamieson 1992). 
Truman’s film, which ran the last week before the election, was created in 
response to Dewey’s professionally-prepared newsreel Qamieson 1992). 
Truman’s film, unlike Dewey’s, maintained a newsreel-like feel to which theatre­
goers were accustomed, perhaps making it more credible and, therefore, more 
effective Qamieson 1992).
The partisan newsreel was estimated to reach a weekly audience of 65 
million in 1948 via the nation’s 20,000 theatres Qamieson 1992). The audience 
was considered a captive one since the theatre attendees paid money to see the 
feature presentation. Therefore, they had a self-interest in staying in the theatre 
throughout the presentation of whatever the theatre offered Qamieson 1992). 
Further, the newsreel was also able to reach voters of all political persuasions 
Qamieson 1992).
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The election of 1948 was also noteworthy in that it was the first in 
which presidential candidates purchased television time in order to influence 
voters (Jamieson 1992). It was, however, in 1951 that coast-to-coast television 
became a reality, thus making massive viewing audiences available to political 
campaigns outside the confines of the movie theatre (Jamieson 1992).
While televised political advertisements continue today to be one of the 
most effective campaign tools, astounding technology is on the horizon that will 
have an enormous impact on the future of political advertising. The use of the 
video cassette, for instance, is becoming very prevalent in helping candidates get 
their political messages out in a precisely targeted manner. New methods of 
voter targeting track whether households have at least one video cassette 
recorder (VCR). Campaigns can then send such households cassette duplications 
of campaign-produced commercials that can be specifically aimed at the 
particular voter. Using voter-specific video cassette distribution, campaigns can 
be spared the necessity of having to purchase costly television air time. To 
create effective levels of recognition for a candidate, a given televised spot has 
to  be seen at least three times and, to  ensure that the spot is viewed that many 
times by any particular voter, a substantial media buy is required on several 
different television channels simultaneously.
The use of video cassettes is advantageous because they are extremely cost 
effective when they are dubbed (copied) in mass quantities, especially in
comparison to television rates. Additionally, the video cassette recipient has the 
opportunity to view the message at his leisure. Also, since the viewer has made 
the conscious choice to watch the video cassette, he or she is much more likely 
to give it greater attention. Above all, the candidate knows, as with his direct 
mail literature, his message is being received in exactly the place he wants it to 
go—where it can be most effective—and is being seen by whom he wishes it to 
be seen.
The emerging VCR campaign technology is just one example. The 
possibilities that personal computers offer to the political campaign, as another 
example, are just beginning to be tapped. With on-line user services composed 
of millions of subscribers, the opportunities for candidates to have their political 
messages available on computer services nationwide are indeed a reality.
While the development of new technology that will surely change the 
means of political communication is exciting to watch as it unfolds, the scope 
of this paper will concentrate instead on the more “traditional” print and 
broadcast media and the roles they play in the realm of political advertising.
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A  D is t in c t io n  B et w ee n  B r o a d c a s t  a n d  P r in t  M e d ia  
Congress and the courts have treated the broadcast and print media 
differently. In contrast to newspaper publishing, the operations of a broadcaster 
have always been subject to elaborate governmental control (Dorsen 1976). The 
apparent rationale for allowing such stringent governmental regulation is that 
broadcast frequencies are a public resource. The ability to use the airwaves is 
limited by the fact that there are a limited number of frequencies to be had 
(Dorsen 1976). The concept that the airwaves are not available to everyone was 
coined the "scarcity theory” by the Supreme Court in the 1943 case of National 
Broadcasting Co. v. U.S. (Dorsen 1976). The notion of the scarcity theory has 
allowed the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) not only to deal with 
the technical and engineering impediments influencing the effective use of the 
broadcast media, but it has also enabled the FCC to establish a regulatory 
scheme to ensure that aired broadcasts conform with “public interest, conve­
nience or necessity” (Dorsen 1976).
T h e  F ir st  A m e n d m e n t  a n d  t h e  A bility  t o  R e g u l a t e
While this paper will spend some time discussing the current policies of 
the FCC as they relate to political advertising, it will also analyze the judicial 
treatment that many political advertising regulations have received inside 
courtrooms across America. Some of these cases deal directly with FCC
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policies, while many others arose as challenges to local and state ordinances in
their attempts to regulate political speech.
Because the right to political speech is one that is protected under the
umbrella of the First Amendment, the judicial system strictly scrutinizes any
attempts to restrict it. In general, however, it appears that if the presiding court
finds that a legitimate governmental interest is served by the regulation, then it
will be allowed to stand. A Harvard Law Review article, “Developments in the
Law—Elections,” perhaps best summarizes the essence of governmental
regulations in the forum of the electoral process:
No institution is more central to the United States’ system of representa­
tive democracy than the election. Americans have continually relied on 
elections to implement the fundamental principle that all sovereignty 
rests in the governed. That almost half of the amendments to the 
Constitution adopted since 1791 have concerned the franchise and 
election procedure highlights the importance of the electoral process. In 
order for elections of public officials (and public referendums) to take 
place, some State regulation is necessary. All States extensively regulate 
a variety of aspects of the electoral process. Laws have been enacted 
regulating campaign financing and spending, campaign speech, and 
various kinds of unscrupulous campaign practices. Many election 
regulations are highly controversial, for considerable disagreement exists 
as to both the propriety of the States’ assuming any role in these areas, 
and the wisdom of specific laws. Moreover, many election laws raise 
serious constitutional questions. Although the power of the State to 
regulate elections is beyond dispute, that power must be exercised within 
the limits imposed by the Constitution (as noted in Kansas v. Davis 
1991).
It is not the intent of this paper to examine every conceivable form of 
regulation imposed upon political advertising. Instead, it should serve as more
of an introductory overview of some of the various types of regulations that 
exist. The information presented herein is intended to serve as a sort of 
reference source for candidates, campaign staffs, political aficionados, and 
perhaps, in a much more limited context, lawmakers as they attempt to discern 
how and what types of regulations are permissible when dealing within the 
“sacred political arena.”
CHAPTER 2
T h e  P o lic ies  o f  t h e  FCC
Clearly, the entire realm of politics has come a long way from the days 
when Lincoln and Douglas participated in numerous multiple-hour debates 
before groups of concerned voters. Today, most of the information that voters 
receive about the individuals seeking office is contained in brief evening news 
“sound bites,” or in campaign-produced thirty-second radio and television 
commercials, or “spots.” Because our society is so media-oriented, it has put 
increased emphasis on a campaign speech writer to fill the candidate’s 
presentation with as many usable sound bites as possible to increase the odds 
of the media actually using at least one of the sound bites, the better to get the 
candidate’s precise message across to the voting public. In the area of paid 
political advertising, a campaign’s media consultants bear the burden of targeting 
demographics and producing “compelling” spots that will get their candidate 
favorably noticed.
Media consultants do not have complete autonomy when it comes to 
crafting political advertisements. The Federal Communications Commission has 
an array of specific guidelines that must be adhered to by both the campaign 
and the broadcasting stations. As recently as December 1991, several changes
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were enacted in the FC C ’s political programming policies. This chapter will 
address the new FCC policies, some of the congressional enactments that led up 
to this sweeping change, and the effectiveness the FC C ’s reforms.
After experiencing the political battles of the 1988 presidential election, 
political pundits surmised that the public’s low expectations of public officials 
had prompted reform (“Talking Heads” 7). Several political advertising and 
accountability reform bills were proposed in the Congress in 1990. Senator Bob 
Graham and Representative Ed Markey co-sponsored a bill intended to 
institutionalize presidential debates (“Talking Heads” 8). Their idea was to 
require all presidential candidates using public financing to participate in at least 
four 90-minute debates, each debate to include 30 minutes of the individual 
candidates directly addressing the viewing audience (“Talking Heads” 8). 
Graham and Markey also sought to use the Public Broadcasting Service to allow 
for 15 prime-time minutes once or twice a week for the candidates to address 
the nation (“Talking Heads” 8).
Another series of reforms was proposed by Senators Warren Rudman and 
Daniel Inouye. They sponsored a bill that would require campaign commercials 
to consist only of the candidate talking to the viewers without elaborate 
graphics or voice-overs—the so-called “talking head” (“Talking Heads” 8). While 
this particular version may, in fact, violate the freedom of expression component 
of the First Amendment, there are other possibilities that could prove to be
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acceptable. One alternative would be to make the “talking head” requirement 
voluntary and provide free television air time for those who comply (“Talking 
Heads” 8). Candidates could be given vouchers to  spend at any television or 
radio station, enabling them to target the precise audiences that would be of 
help to them in terms of votes (“Talking Heads” 8). If the station, as a whole, 
were to exceed its ceiling time allotment, the government could reimburse the 
station for the additional time at standard advertising rates with money raised 
by the voluntary presidential campaign contribution box found on Federal 
income tax returns (“Talking Heads” 8). It is believed that such a plan could 
reduce the influence of powerful political action committees (PACs) (“Talking 
Heads” 8).
Essentially, the basis of a reform proposal like this is to give candidates 
large amounts of “free” television and radio time for voluntary spending 
limitations and for voluntary compliance with the “talking heads” rule (“Talking 
Heads” 8). While it is acknowledged that the “talking heads” rule would not 
mean the end of negative televised ads, it would be a step in a more positive 
direction.
The two congressional enactments that eventually provided the impetus 
for the FC C ’s policy reforms came in the form of bills S. 3 and H.R. 3750. 
Senate Campaign Reform Bill S. 3 was authored by Senator David Boren and 
it passed the senate in May of 1991 by a 56-to-42 margin (Sukow 35). The
legislation requires that broadcasters sell all eligible candidates advertising time 
at their “lowest unit rate” on a non-preemptible basis (Sukow 35). The bill also 
sets voluntary spending limits for senatorial candidates only, and those senate 
campaigns that remain below the established limits between the primary and 
general elections would be eligible for a further 50% discount off the lowest unit 
rate (Sukow 35). Additionally, S. 3 creates a government-funded voucher 
program to lessen the costs for large blocks of political advertising, such as 
longer format spots that run from one to five minutes each (Sukow 35).
Senator John Danforth amended S. 3 to allow for preemptions of spots 
until they are paid in full (Sukow 35). The amendment also made it very clear 
that broadcasters will not be penalized if a spot is preempted by circumstances 
beyond the station’s control, such as late-breaking news (Sukow 35). Addition­
ally, limitations were placed on the period in which candidates would be eligible 
for the lowest unit rate: 30 days before the primary and 45 days before the 
general election, with the exception of those candidates eligible for the extra 
50% discount (Sukow 35).
The House Campaign Spending Limit and Election Reform Act (H.R. 
3750) was sponsored by Representative Sam Gejdenson (Sukow 35). The bill 
contained the lowest unit rate aspects of the Danforth amendment, but without 
providing for the 50% discount for either House or Senate members (Sukow 35). 
This bill was not without its critics from within the broadcasting industry. In
fact, it was several months after the hearings commenced on the initiative that 
the broadcasting trade group, the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB), 
agreed to support the passage of a policy that would guarantee political 
candidates that their commercials would air when scheduled at the lowest unit 
rate and that these lowest rates would be available 30 days prior to the primaries 
and 45 days prior to the general elections (“National Association” 51).
W ith the support of the broadcasters, the Federal Communications 
Commission ultimately adopted these reforms in the Commission’s political 
programming policies on December 12, 1991 (FCC 91-403, 1). There were four 
major components to the reform: Reasonable access, equal opportunities, lowest- 
unit-charge, and political file requirements (FCC 91-403, 1).
R e a s o n a b l e  A ccess  
Reasonable access is a term that applies solely to candidates running for 
Federal offices (FCC 91-403, 6). It requires stations to use reasonable, good faith 
judgement in providing equal access to broadcasting media sources (FCC 91-403, 
8). There is no formal mechanism to determine exactly what reasonable access 
would entail. The Commission will look at the particular issues in a given case 
to determine if reasonable access had or had not been afforded (FCC 91-403, 8).
While FCC licensees can forbid the sale of time for political advertise­
ments during news broadcasts, there are a few guidelines to which stations must 
adhere in the area of reasonable access (FCC 91-403, 9). Reasonable access must
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be provided at least 45 days before a primary and 60 days before either a general 
or special election (FCC 91-403, 9). Commercial and noncommercial stations 
alike must make program time available to Federal candidates during prime time 
and other periods unless circumstances exist that make it reasonable to deny 
access (FCC 91-403, 9). If a commercial station chooses to donate rather than 
sell advertising time to candidates, then it must make time of the same various 
lengths that it allows for commercial advertisers available free of charge to the 
Federal candidates (FCC 91-403, 9). Further, a station may not use a denial of 
reasonable access as a way to censor or exert control over the content of 
political material (FCC 91-403, 10). However, stations can take into account 
their programming and business commitments, including the numbers of 
candidates running in a particular race, the program disruption that would be 
caused by the political advertising, and the amount of time already sold to a 
candidate when they decide whether or not to afford the candidate reasonable 
access (FCC 91-403, 10).
The reasonable access provision does not apply to non-Federal candidates. 
In addressing this issue, the Commission decided to stand by its existing policy 
of not allowing a “specific right of access” to state and local candidates (FCC 91- 
403,11). Section 312(a)(7) of the political broadcasting laws explicitly states that 
the reasonable access provision creates a right of reasonable access exclusively 
for Federal candidates (FCC 91-403, 11). Even the Supreme Court, in the case
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of CBS, Inc. v. FCC, stated that, under the “public interest” standard, “an 
individual [non-Federal] candidate can claim no personal right of access” (FCC 
91-403, 11). Stations may satisfy any public interest obligation with regard to 
state and local elections through the areas of news and public affairs program­
ming (FCC 91403, 11).
Overall, the real basis of the reasonable access provision is to require 
stations to allow Federal candidates reasonable access to a station’s facilities. 
Also, it is to allow the Federal candidates to purchase what are considered 
“reasonable amounts of time” (FCC 91403, 6).
Eq u a l  O p p o r t u n it ie s  
The second major component of the FCC’s reforms is that of equal 
opportunities. This requires that stations which allow Federal, state, or local 
candidates to “use” the station must provide equal opportunities to all other 
candidates running for the same office to likewise “use” the station (FCC 91403, 
14). Bona fide newscasts, as well as news interviews, documentaries, and news 
events, are all exempt from this requirement (FCC 91403, 15). A bona fide 
newscast is one deemed to report upon news of some area of current events in 
a manner similar to more traditional newscasts (FCC 91403, 15). Licensees are 
expected to exercise control over the newscast by exercising their editorial 
discretion as to whether or not to air a program that may constitute a candidate 
“use” (FCC 91403, 16).
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A “use” means an appearance by the candidate by voice or picture in 
which the candidate is identifiable to the audience (FCC 91-403, 17). It includes 
only nonexempt candidate appearances that are controlled, approved, or 
sponsored by the candidate (or the candidate’s recognized committee) after the 
time when the candidate becomes a legally qualified candidate (FCC 91-403, 17). 
If a legally qualified candidate does not voluntarily appear in a nonexempt 
broadcast, such as unauthorized, independently-sponsored advertisements or 
rebroadcasts of appearances made prior to the particular candidate attaining the 
status of a legally qualified candidate, his appearance would not constitute a 
“use” (FCC 91-403, 18). Essentially, the definition of “use” depends solely on 
whether a given appearance was voluntary (under the candidate’s control) after 
the candidate had become a legally qualified candidate.
In the area of sponsorship identification guidelines, the FCC has required 
additional actions to ensure that sponsor information is more available to the 
public (FCC 91-403, 21). Stations must keep lists of information for inspection 
by the public pertaining to a political sponsor’s identity (FCC 91-403, 21). 
Announcements of sponsorship in those advertisements that run for five 
minutes or more are to be made at both the beginning and at the end of the 
advertisement (FCC 91-403, 21). Political advertisements carried by television 
stations are required to have both audio and video identification (FCC 91403, 
23). The minimum video identification of the sponsor is to appear with letters
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equal to or greater than 4% of the picture height, and the identification must 
appear on the screen for no less than ten continuous seconds (FCC 91-403, 24).
A reasonable standard basis is to be used by the licensees to assure that 
the size and timing requirements are being met (FCC 91-403, 24).
The “liability for incorrect sponsorship identification rests with licensees” 
(FCC 91-403, 21). In this light, stations may require that political advertise­
ments contain the appropriate sponsorship announcements (FCC 91-403, 21). 
This is an exception to the no-censorship rule described earlier. When 
identifying the appropriate sponsor of the political material, licensees need only 
exercise reasonable care (FCC 91-403, 21).
The FCC does not require candidates to submit their advertisements to 
the station prior to being aired so that the station might determine whether the 
advertisement complies with the sponsorship identification rules (FCC 91-403, 
23). Instead, the FCC adheres to a policy of permitting broadcasters to request 
a pre-airing submission of the advertisement to determine if it meets with both 
technical and sponsorship requirements (FCC 91-403, 24). There are occasions, 
however, when the candidate refuses to allow the advertisement to be 
pre-screened, or when there is insufficient time to review an advertisement that 
should be run without delay (FCC 91-403, 24). In such cases, the station can 
presume that the advertisement complies with the established requirements and 
they may run it the first time without fear of FCC sanctions (FCC 91-403, 24).
If it is discovered that the proper identification is lacking, then it is the station’s 
responsibility to add or modify the message of sponsorship to bring it into 
compliance (FCC 91-403, 24).
Lowest-unit-charge
The third major area of reform involves that of the “lowest-unit-charge.” 
The concept of providing for the lowest-unit-charge came about in 1972 when 
Congress added Section 315(b) to the Communications Act (FCC 91-403, 24). 
The Section directs broadcast and cable stations to charge political candidates the 
“lowest-unit-charge of the station” for the same class, time period, and amount 
of time as a station’s “most-favored advertiser” during a window of time that is 
to run from 45 days prior to a primary election and 60 days prior to a general 
election (FCC 91-403, 24). Congress’ expressed intent was “to give candidates 
for public office greater access to the media and . . .  to halt the spiraling costs 
of campaigning for public office” (FCC 91-403, 24). Congress wanted stations 
to place candidates in the same class as a broadcaster’s “most-favored advertiser” 
(FCC 91403, 24).
The broadcaster is responsible for informing the candidates about the 
lowest-unit-charge. A particular candidate’s lack of knowledge about the lower 
rates does not alleviate the broadcaster’s obligation to offer the candidate this 
reduced rate (FCC 91403, 26). The station is required to disclose information 
to candidates regarding the description and definition of each class available to
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commercial advertisers, and that such information be complete enough to allow 
candidates to identify and understand what specific attributes differentiate each 
class (FCC 91-403, 26). A complete description of the lowest-unit-charge and 
related privileges—such as priorities against preemption and “make-goods” prior 
to specific deadlines—for each class of time offered to commercial advertisers 
must also be provided to candidates (FCC 91-403, 27). Also, a description of 
the method a station uses to sell preemptible time—as well as the likelihood of 
preemption for each kind of preemptible time—must be disclosed (FCC 91-403, 
27). Finally, the station must inform the candidate about how its sales practices 
are conducted with regard to audience delivery impacts (FCC 91-403, 27). Once 
complete disclosure is made, stations must negotiate in good faith to sell time 
to candidates in accordance with this disclosure (FCC 91-403, 27).
There are two primary categories or classes of time: preemptible and non- 
preemptible time. Preemptible time, as its name implies, consists of flexible 
time slots that can be preempted from airing at a particular time by the 
broadcaster (FCC 91-403, 30). There are also several different forms of 
preemptible time, ranging from immediately preemptible, where the spot can 
be rescheduled indefinitely or until another time, to preemptible with notice, 
where the station must give prior notice to the individual if the spot is to be cut 
(FCC 91-403, 30). A class such as preemptible with notice is generally more 
expensive than one that is immediately preemptible because of the additional
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notification provided to the client so that alternate arrangements can be made 
quickly. However, all of the different classifications of preemptible time still 
must be offered to the candidate at the lowest-unit-charge (FCC 91-403, 30).
Non-preemptible classes of time are even more costly than preemptible 
time because of the fact that spots in this time class cannot be deleted from their 
scheduled airing (FCC 91-403, 30). Non-preemptible time is usually sold for a 
particular range of time during which the spot will air. This range of time 
could consist of the spot airing during a certain program, or at a specific time 
of the day (FCC 91-403, 30).
Yet another classification that is closely related to non-preemptible time 
is fixed-position time. Fixed-position is the most costly of the three classes 
because a fixed-position spot is guaranteed to air at the time denoted (FCC 91- 
403, 30). If the spot is scheduled to appear at 8:15 p.m. on August 31st, then 
that is precisely when the station must air this spot.
Under the lowest-unit-charge rule, the creation of special, “premium- 
priced” classes of time sold to candidates is prohibited (FCC 91-403, 35). 
Stations may sell the costly fixed-position or non-preemptible time to candidates 
if such a higher-priced class of time is made available to both candidates and 
commercial advertisers alike, and that no lower-priced class of time—such as 
preemptible—is, in a functional sense, equivalent to the non-preemptible class 
(FCC 91403, 36).
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Stations are allowed to calculate the lowest-unit-charge on a weekly basis 
in conjunction with the sale of weekly rotations (FCC 91-403, 37). Stations 
must verify that the lowest-unit-charge is the lowest price paid by any advertiser 
during a given period in a certain week. This includes those commercial 
advertisers or other political candidates whose spots appeared in that particular 
week, but who may have standing contracts with the station that are in effect 
over the course of several weekly rotations (FCC 91-403, 37).
Distinctly different rotations constitute separate periods of time for the 
purposes of calculating the lowest-unit-charge, regardless of whether or not they 
overlap with one another (FCC 91-403, 38). Distinctly different rotations are 
rotations that have “meaningful differences in value” to an advertiser (FCC 91- 
403, 38). For example, a radio morning-drive time rotation of 6:00 a.m. to 
9:00 a.m. is a distinctly different rotation from a 6:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. rotation 
due to the possibility that the advertiser’s spot could run in the less valuable 
10:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. time period.
No rate increases are allowed during the campaign period except in those 
circumstances where changes in “ordinary business practices” dictate such 
alterations (FCC 91-403, 39). Such circumstances could include changes in 
audience ratings, seasonal program changes, and rate changes that occur on a 
weekly basis at those stations that sell time on a weekly basis (FCC 91-403, 39). 
Candidates who sign a contract with the station to purchase time after the
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effective date of such a rate increase are entitled to the lower rates charged to 
other advertisers, whether they are commercial or political, who contracted for 
time prior to the rate increase, provided that the spots are of the same class and 
length (FCC 91-403, 39).
“Fire sale” time availabilities are those sold at the last minute when it is 
determined that there is available time inventory (FCC 91-403, 44). Stations are 
to treat fire sales as affecting all classes of time, but only during the particular 
time period in which fire sale spots are broadcast (FCC 91-403, 44). The fire 
sale rate must be made available to all candidates and the availability of the fire 
sale time also must be fully disclosed (FCC 61-403, 45).
A “make-good” refers to those situations when an advertisement is 
preempted and the station is forced to find a new availability in which to 
reschedule the advertisement (FCC 91-403, 45). A station is required to offer 
make-goods to candidates if make-goods are also offered to the station’s 
commercial advertisers who have purchased time in the same class (FCC 91-403, 
45). Make-goods for political spots must air before the election and “where the 
licensee would so treat its most-favored commercial advertiser where time is of 
the essence” (FCC 91-403, 46).
Stations are required to include make-goods in lowest-unit-charge 
calculations (FCC 91403, 47). When determining the lowest-unit-charge for a 
particular class of time, a broadcaster must include the rate paid by an advertiser
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whose spot was “made good” during that same period (FCC 91-403, 48). Where 
a station places a make-good in a more valuable program or time of day, the 
value of that make-good must be factored into the calculation of the lowest-unit- 
charge for that more valuable time slot (FCC 91-403, 48). Candidates who 
purchase a more expensive spot than the one in which the station provides the 
make-good are entitled to a rebate of the difference between the rate they paid 
and the rate of the make-good spot (FCC 91-403, 48). If a candidate’s promised 
audience delivery falls below the anticipated level, then the candidate is to be 
given an additional make-good or a bonus spot in the same manner as would be 
offered to commercial advertisers (FCC 91-403, 48).
The FCC’s lowest-unit-charge sold-out policy states that a station may 
not inform candidates that the preemptible time is sold out in order to leave 
them no choice but to purchase non-preemptible spots during the same program 
or time period (FCC 91-403, 49). There is no requirement that a station is to 
sell time during a given program, but once a station decides to sell time within 
a given period, it cannot inflate the price of a spot sold to a candidate beyond 
the minimum necessary by stating that all the preemptible time is sold out 
(FCC 91-403, 49).
P o lit ic a l F ile Requirements 
The final area of reform addressed by the FCC is in the area of station 
political file requirements (FCC 91-403, 49). The FCC requires that a station
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maintain neat and accurate political files so that anyone viewing the files can 
easily determine what the station has sold or provided to each and every 
candidate (FCC 91-403, 50). Station files are to include information showing the 
schedule of the time provided or purchased, when the spots actually aired, the 
rates charged, and the classes of time purchased (FCC 91403, 51). This 
information is necessary to determine whether a station is providing candidates 
with equal opportunities and whether they are receiving favorable or unfavor­
able treatment in the placement of spots (FCC 91403, 51). Such treatment is 
especially important when one considers the fact that most stations offer widely 
varying rotations (FCC 91403, 51).
R eactions t o  th e  FCC P o licy  Changes 
As one can easily see, the changes made by the FCC in the area of 
political programming reforms are quite vast. Because of this, it was probably 
of no great shock when important judicial questions began emerging even before 
the FC C ’s proposed policy revisions were down on paper. In October of 1991, 
a state court in Alabama ruled that political candidates should be permitted to 
take broadcasters to court for alleged overcharges for political commercials (“An 
Alabama” 12). The broadcasters, in their losing effort, had argued that it should 
be the FCC who decides whether or how much overcharging had occurred (“An 
Alabama” 12).
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The FCC responded to the legal predicament by asserting total 
jurisdiction over enforcement of the lowest-unit-charge law (Jessell 34). This 
stand taken by the FCC had the effect of preempting lawsuits filed against 
stations by political candidates claiming to have been overcharged for airing 
their spots (Jessell 34). Due to the number of lawsuits filed in state courts as a 
result of the Alabama decision, the National Association of Broadcasters lobbied 
extensively to convince the FCC to assert jurisdiction in determining the lowest- 
unit-charge rate liability and remedies (Jessell 34). Additionally, the FCC 
decided to include complaint procedures that would allow for a discovery 
process that would be similar to what would be expected in a court of law 
(Jessell 34).
As one might expect, the political complaints came in large numbers. It 
is interesting to note the types of complaints rejected by the FCC. A complaint 
filed by Democratic congressional candidate Tom Laughlin alleged that the 
reasonable access provision was denied him when a television station in New 
Hampshire rescheduled an hour-long segment that Laughlin had purchased to 
immediately follow a debate in which he took part (“FCC Turns” 6). Further, 
the station required Laughlin to submit a video tape of his hour-long show, 
refusing to allow him to broadcast live (“FCC Turns” 6). In its decision, the 
FCC agreed that he had the right to broadcast live, but that there was no 
definitive evidence that the rescheduling was unreasonable (“FCC Turns” 6).
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Democratic congressional candidate Lenora Fulani complained that public 
stations WGBH-TV in Boston and WENH-TV in Durham both denied her 
equal opportunity after they refused to provide her with two hours of prime 
time programming (“FCC Turns” 6). The stations both took this position 
partly because she was not included in a debate between five Democratic 
candidates that was produced by MacNeil/Lehrer Productions and aired by PBS 
(“FCC Turns” 6). The stations did offer her five minutes of programming 
instead of the two hours, and the FCC held that this concession was not 
unreasonable and thus denied her complaint (“FCC Turns” 6).
A somewhat related issue involved a law firm that represents the 
majority of the political candidates who file complaints against broadcasters for 
their alleged violations of the lowest-unit-charge rules (“Barnes, Browning” 56). 
The firm of Barnes, Browning, Tanksley and Casurella filed a suit against the 
Arbitron rating organization (“Barnes, Browning” 56). The suit alleged a breach 
of contract because Arbitron apparently reneged on its agreement to sell its 
ratings information to the law firm (“Barnes, Browning” 56). It seems that 
Arbitron decided not to sell the ratings information when it learned that the 
information would be used to determine whether the stations had overcharged 
Barnes, Browning, Tanksley and Casurella’s political clients (“Barnes, Browning” 
56). An Arbitron spokesperson stated that the company “does not seek to 
profit from selling data that would be used against our customers” (“Barnes,
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Browning” 56). Bobby Kahn, a partner in the law firm, remarked that 
Arbitron’s actions were part of a “conspiracy of the industry as a whole to deny 
refunds of overcharges” (“Barnes, Browning” 56). Although a decision in the 
case is forthcoming, it is noteworthy that the Superior Court of Fulton County, 
Georgia, not the FCC, will be the forum in which the verdict is rendered.
Complaints of a different nature abound regarding the FCC’s new 
policies. Indeed, even months after the comprehensive political broadcasting 
rules were adopted, groups of broadcasters, politicians, and citizens demanded 
still more reforms (Flint 50). In the area of audio sponsorship, many claim that 
the requirement falls under the category of “forced political speech,” which 
would naturally abridge the First Amendment, because at least 20% of a thirty- 
second campaign commercial would be filled by the audio identification 
requirement (Flint 50). This, advocates claim, would “unreasonably and 
unconstitutionally” limit political speech (Flint 50). Candidates are now only 
able to purchase twenty-four seconds rather than thirty seconds at the lowest- 
unit-charge, which would seemingly deprive the candidates of their benefit 
granted by Congress (Flint 50). Such a policy, according to the Republican 
National Committee, defeats the purpose of the lowest unit rate when 
candidates pay for a thirty-second spot, of which six seconds are not available 
for use (Flint 50). With the continuation of this requirement, it appears that 
ten-second and fifteen-second spots would be virtually eliminated (Flint 50).
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A group known as the Media Access Project is upset at the FCC’s 
definition of just what constitutes a “use” (Flint 50). In the past, the FCC 
defined a “use” to consist of any identifiable appearance by a candidate, either 
by voice or picture (Flint 50). Now, with increased emphasis placed on the 
attainment of a candidate’s legally qualified status in order for that candidate’s 
appearances to constitute a “use,” Media Access Project believes that this will 
allow independent groups—such as political action committees (PACs)—to 
aggressively promote their favorite candidates without triggering a “use” as 
depicted in Section 315 of the political broadcasting laws (Flint 50).
Several groups of broadcasters—including the CBS and ABC television 
networks—and the National Association of Broadcasters have filed complaints 
with the FCC (Flint 50). They contend that the “news adjacency rate,” which 
applies to political advertisers who choose to air their spots immediately prior 
to and after a news broadcast, is unnecessary (Flint 50). The broadcasters 
believe that the time before and after the newscasts should be priced and sold 
to political advertisers in a manner that is consistent with that offered to 
commercial advertisers (Flint 50).
Additionally, the broadcasters disagree with the provision that requires 
them to insert the sponsorship identification in an advertisement that does not 
meet the necessary FCC requirements (Flint 50). They see themselves put into 
the position that the advertiser should be in, because the liability for compliance
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with the sponsorship identification is on the broadcaster instead of the advertiser 
(Flint 50).
At the same time, the broadcasters themselves come under fire for 
requiring up-front payment from political advertisers. The Federal Election 
Commission (FEC) insists that broadcasters ease the rules for advance payment 
(“In-credit-able” 22). The chief of the FC C ’s political programming branch 
states that “requiring advance payment is inappropriate” if a candidate or a 
candidate’s agency has a credit history that is comparable to the commercial 
advertisers that are allowed to pay on credit (“In-credit-able” 22). Since a 
candidate with an unfavorable credit rating can hire and use an agency with a 
favorable credit history, there are several political consulting agencies that are 
unhappy with the thought that they may be pressured into sacrificing their own 
good credit ratings on behalf of candidates who may be unable to pay the bills 
(“In-credit-able” 22).
CHAPTER 3
The Role of the Courts
The courts at both the Federal and state levels have dealt rather 
extensively with several aspects of political advertising. This chapter will 
examine some of the more compelling judicial treatments of political advertising. 
These cases, heard in various venues from the Supreme Court down to the state 
district courts, deal with issues ranging from advertising rates for politicians to 
provisions placing restrictions on campaign literature.
The first such case, AC LU  v. Jennings, which was decided in 1973 by the 
U.S. District Court in the District of Columbia, is considered a landmark 
decision due to the magnitude of its outcome. Jennings is significant in that it 
appears to  have the effect of helping to  determine what constitutes a political 
advertisement and what does not. In Jennings, the plaintiff, the American Civil 
Liberties Union, sought to publish an advertisement during the 1972 presidential 
campaign that had the effect of denouncing the incumbent {ACLU  v. Jennings 
1973). The advertisement, which the plaintiff submitted for publication to The 
New York Times in September of 1972, expressed the ACLU’s opposition to the 
Nixon Administration-backed legislation which was designed to limit court-
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ordered busing {ACLU v. Jennings 1973). In the advertisement, the plaintiff 
listed the names of the 102 members of the House of Representatives who had 
previously opposed this antibusing policy {ACLU v. Jennings 1973). While the 
plaintiff did hope to generate favorable public opinion to their position by 
publishing the ad, there was no intention by the plaintiff to aid in the election 
or reelection of any political candidate {ACLU v. Jennings 1973). Upon 
receiving the advertisement, the New York Times notified the plaintiff that their 
failure to comply with the certification requirements of Title I of the 1971 
Federal Election Campaign Act precluded them from printing their advertise­
ment {ACLU  v. Jennings 1973).
The Title I certification requirement is such that any person who wants 
to publish an advertisement for a candidate has to obtain certification from that 
candidate stating that the publication of the advertisement would not have the 
effect of exceeding the candidate’s allotted spending limits {ACLU v. Jennings 
1973). Certification is also required in order to print statements made about 
candidates in a derogatory fashion {ACLU v. Jennings 1973). The certification 
was designed to establish the independence of the sponsor from any candidates 
for election opposing the candidate who is denounced in the particular 
advertisement {ACLU  v. Jennings 1973). The sponsor of a derogatory 
advertisement must either state its source, or provide a disclaimer stating that
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no other candidate has authorized the publication of the advertisement (ACLU 
v. Jennings 1973).
The ACLU filed suit alleging that Title I was unconstitutional in that it 
imposed undue burdens that had the effect of infringing upon the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution (ACLU  v. Jennings 1973). After 
the suit was filed, the district court ordered a preliminary injunction that 
allowed The New York Times to publish a revised copy of the plaintiff’s original 
advertisement on October 27, 1972 (ACLU  v. Jennings 1973). This revised 
advertisement referred to the ongoing court dispute, proclaiming “It took a 
court order to get this advertisement printed” (ACLU  v. Jennings 1973).
Title I, while it applied to the media and not directly to the plaintiffs, 
caused the plaintiffs to suffer harm as they were exposed to a prior restraint on 
their right to speak freely (ACLU  v. Jennings 1973). The restraint was enforced 
by the Times, a private party, because of the threat of criminal sanctions under 
Title I (ACLU  v. Jennings 1973).
The defendants attempted to dismiss the proceedings on the grounds of 
mootness because the advertisement had already run, but the court held that the 
situation presented in the case was one that involved challenging a governmental 
policy that is, in the words of the Roe Court, “capable of repetition, yet evading 
review” (ACLU  v. Jennings 1973). The defendants submitted affidavits that 
spoke to the effect that, in their opinions as governmental officials, the
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restrictions that would ordinarily be necessary under Title I would not apply 
because the statute was never intended to apply to organizations such as the 
ACLU, but to bona fide political committees that advocate certain candidates 
for office (ACLU  v. Jennings 1973). The court held that the defendants’ 
affidavits only served to express an administrative judgement that is discretion­
ary at best (ACLU  v. Jennings 1973).
According to the court, “Title I is tantamount to government prescrip­
tion of what may or may not appear in public print” if the publication is 
printed without certification and the media is subject to criminal prosecution 
(ACLU  v. Jennings 1973). The court noted that previous attempts to impose 
prior restraints on political speech have consistently met with “judicial disfavor” 
(ACLU  v. Jennings 1973). The sort of speech involved in this case is, as Justice 
Brennan called it in Garrison v. Louisiana, “. . . more than self-expression, it is 
the essence of self-government” (ACLU v. Jennings 1973). The district court 
went on to state:
Any attempt to restrict the free and unfettered dissemination of such 
opinions cannot be favorably viewed. The fact that restrictions have 
been imposed in furtherance of matters of legitimate governmental 
concern is neither dispositive nor, in this instance, persuasive (ACLU  v. 
Jennings 1973).
The court explained that Title I caused unacceptable prior restraints that 
had the effect of discouraging open discussions on topics of public interest and 
was, therefore, an unconstitutional means of achieving Congress’ objectives
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(ACLU  v. Jennings 1973). The method by which these prior restraints are to be 
enforced by the media appears to intensify the Title’s unconstitutional nature 
(ACLU  v. Jennings 1973). The court stated that the media should not be placed 
in the role of the deciding factor as to whether or not a particular advertisement 
meets the requirements under the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), 
since, in those instances when the media believes that a certain advertisement 
may be permissible, but is unsure, the advertisement may not be published for 
fear of potential criminal prosecution (ACLU  v. Jennings 1973).
Overall, the court declared that “the airing of opinion in a public forum 
must not be subordinated to political expediencies.” Therefore, the court held 
Title I, subsection 104(b) to be facially unconstitutional (ACLU  v. Jennings 
1973).
Also under examination in the Jennings case was whether Title III of the 
FECA was constitutional. The effect of Title III upon the plaintiffs’ First 
Amendment rights seemingly was not as clear cut as the court found Title I to 
be (ACLU  v. Jennings 1973). Plaintiffs contended that the “reporting and 
disclosure” requirements that Title III imposes on political committees that 
would be triggered by the publication of the advertisement should be deemed 
an unconstitutional violation of their right to freely associate (ACLU  v. Jennings 
1973). Publishing the names of those affiliated with the plaintiffs’ organization 
would also be against their right to privacy (ACLU  v. Jennings 1973).
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Title III defines political committees as groups that receive contributions 
or spend more than $1,000 per year in order to influence the election of a 
Federal candidate (ACLU  v. Jennings 1973). The plaintiff argued that the 
vagueness of this definition concerning what constitutes a political committee 
may be construed in such a way as to compel those organizations that wish to 
express their opinions politically, but not advocate a particular candidate for 
office, to submit to the disclosure requirements (ACLU  v. Jennings 1973).
Seeking to avoid declaring all of Title III unconstitutional, however 
unclear the definition of political committee was regarded as being, the court 
stated:
We are of the opinion that the contested operational language of Title 
III is susceptible to a limited and narrow construction which will at once 
remove any chilling effects worked upon the plaintiffs as well as obviate 
the necessity of this court having to invalidate the Title (ACLU v. 
Jennings 1973).
The court went on to explain how the Second Circuit of the United 
States Court of Appeals had previously defined political committees under Title 
III as “those groups which solicit contributions or make expenditures, the major 
purpose of which is the nomination or election of candidates into Federal 
office” (ACLU  v. Jennings 1973). Satisfied that this definition was in accordance 
with the primary concern of the Act, which was campaign reform and 
addressing the problems of excessive campaign expenditures, the court concluded
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that the plaintiff, on the basis of the advertisement submitted, was not subject 
to the regulations required by Title III {ACLU v. Jennings 1973).
In Sadowski v. Shevin, the Florida Supreme Court reviewed a Florida 
statute that restricted candidates for public office from making any use of the 
advertising media except during a specified “political season” {Sadowski v. Shevin 
1977). Sadowski was a candidate for a seat in the Florida House of Representa­
tives whose opponent was the incumbent legislator {Sadowski v. Shevin 1977). 
The statute prohibited Sadowski from filing for office and paying his filing fees 
and party assessments until noon on July 6, 1976, the sixty-third day before the 
primary, which was also after the scheduled adjournment of the regular session 
of the Florida State Legislature {Sadowski v. Shevin 1977).
It was Sadowski’s intent to spend campaign funds for media advertising 
and printing before qualifying for office, but he was prevented from doing so 
because of Section 106.15(1) of the Florida Statutes that held:
N o person, candidate, political party, political committee or person
acting on behalf of another shall, prior to qualifying for office, directly
or indirectly in furtherance of any candidacy make use of:
(a) Advertising on radio or television;
(b) Advertising in newspapers, magazines or periodicals;
(c) Advertising on billboards, banners or streamers;
(d) Advertising on campaign literature or any other printing; or
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(e) A rented hall in which to address the public. (Sadowski v. Shevin 
1977)
Sadowski filed a complaint seeking to have Section 106.15(1) declared unconsti­
tutional because he contended that it abridged his constitutional right to speak 
out on the public issues of the day, including the activities of the Florida 
legislature while in session {Sadowski v. Shevin 1977).
In its review of the case, the Florida Supreme Court held that Section 
106.15(1) of the Florida statutes, which regulated election activities, was a 
restraint of free speech and a restriction on the “quantity of a candidate’s 
communication and diversity of political speech” contrary to the dictates of the 
Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo, as it constituted a limitation on candidate 
spending {Sadowski v. Shevin 1977). The statute denied candidates their 
“fundamental right to speak to political issues and to advocate their candidacy 
by making use of advertising” in the various media and in rented halls until they 
were well within the described political season {Sadowski v. Shevin 1977). 
Simply because candidates are allowed to spend unlimited amounts for 
advertising activities within the designated political season does not compensate 
for the speech restraints, according to  the court {Sadowski v. Shevin 1977).
The court went further in its holding to state that the people who 
comprise the electorate are entitled to receive all the information that each 
candidate can provide about himself, his opponent, and their specific stances on
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political issues (Sadowski v. Shevin 1977). The court believed that the entire 
election process was hampered if the information was restricted or was 
unavailable as the public’s “need to know” was most critical during an election 
campaign {Sadowski v. Shevin 1977).
Shevin, Florida’s attorney general, argued that section 106.15(1) advanced 
an important governmental interest by protecting the public from “frivolous or 
fraudulent candidacies” and that it prevented acts of deception and frustration 
in the democratic process by restricting the use of campaign advertising to only 
“serious candidates” {Sadowski v. Shevin 1977).
The court refuted this argument stating that the statute did not have the 
ability to bring about this result because there was nothing in the act to prevent 
a candidate from making his candidacy known to the public through means of 
communication other than those specified by the statute {Sadowski v. Shevin 
1977). Furthermore, the court stated that if the public were given the necessary 
information, then it would be able to adequately fulfill its responsibility to sort 
out the candidates in the field and decide which ones were serious as opposed 
to those engaging in “political frivolity” {Sadowski v. Shevin 1977). Thus, 
because Section 106.15(1) was designed to serve as a limitation on the quantity 
of political speech, the court declared the act unconstitutional as a violation of 
freedom of political speech rights {Sadowski v. Shevin 1977).
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Libel
In 1964, the United States Supreme Court handed down a landmark 
decision in the case of New York Times v. Sullivan. The Court held that a 
publication is responsible for libel contained in any advertising it carries {New 
York Times v. Sullivan 1964). The rule arising out of Sullivan was that a 
plaintiff, to prevail in a libel suit, must be able to prove with “convincing 
clarity” before the court that the offensive statements were invalid and made 
with “actual malice” {New York Times v. Sullivan 1964). Actual malice refers 
to the knowledge that the questionable statements were false or were made with 
“reckless disregard” of whether they were false or not {New York Times v. 
Sullivan 1964). Thus, it was necessary for a plaintiff to prove that the 
newspaper had prior knowledge that the advertisement submitted was untrue 
or that the publication acted in a “reckless” manner by not carefully scrutinizing 
the content of the publication if the advertisement appeared questionable on its 
face.
The “Sullivan rule” was at issue in the cases of Varanese v. Gall and 
Cronley v. Pensacola News-Joumal. In Varanese, the Ohio Supreme Court 
declared that a newspaper’s liability for failure to check the accuracy of a 
political advertisement was limited to those situations where the newspaper 
actually knew before printing that the statement was false or where the 
statement appeared to be facially false {Varanese v. Gall 1988). The plaintiff,
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Barbara Varanese, was a candidate for Geauga County Commissioner and, at the 
time the advertisement was published, she was serving as the Geauga County 
Treasurer (Varanese v. Gall 1988).
The advertisement in question was submitted to the Geauga Times Leader 
and the Maple Leaf Shopper by the Committee to Elect Tony Gall. Gall was the 
plaintiff’s opponent for the county commission seat (Varanese v. Gall 1988). 
The advertisement charged the plaintiff with various acts of misfeasance and 
nonfeasance in her capacity as treasurer and positioned her as an advocate for 
the elimination of various services including programs supporting veterans, the 
elderly, and conservation (Varanese v. Gall 1988). The advertisement provided 
footnotes to support the allegations, several of which cited the Geauga Times 
Leader as a source of information (Varanese v. Gall 1988). The plaintiff 
ultimately lost her election bid (Varanese v. Gall 1988).
At the trial court, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgement 
asserting that, as a public official, the plaintiff was required to show that the 
defendant acted with actual malice (Varanese v. Gall 1988). The defendant 
contended that the plaintiff could produce no evidence sufficient to demonstrate 
such actual malice with “convincing clarity” (Varanese v. Gall 1988).
While the trial court was in apparent agreement with the defendant and 
granted his motion for summary judgement, the Ohio Court of Appeals
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reversed this ruling on appeal (Varanese v. Gall 1988). The court of appeals 
reasoned that,
. . . the record contains evidence from which a jury could determine 
with convincing clarity that Lake-Geauga Printing Co. published the 
advertisement with actual malice, and with a high degree of awareness 
of its probable falsity (Varanese v. Gall 1988).
The case was then appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court, which reversed 
the decision handed down by the court of appeals (Varanese v. Gall 1988). The 
court stated that the case hinged on a single question: Whether or not the 
appellee, Varanese, presented enough evidence to withstand appellant’s motion 
for summary judgement on the question of actual malice (Varanese v. Gall 
1988). The court found that appellee’s evidence of actual malice to be 
insufficient (Varanese v. Gall 1988). The court reasoned that, at the time the 
advertisement was printed, Varanese was a public official and, thus, she bore the 
burden of proving, with convincing clarity, that Gall published the advertise­
ment with actual malice (Varanese v. Gall 1988). The court explained that the 
Supreme Court, in New York Times v. Sullivan, held that reckless disregard on 
the part of the newspaper must be established by “clear and convincing 
evidence” that the publication went ahead and published the piece with “a high 
awareness of . . . probable falsity,” or that “[it] entertained serious doubts as to 
the truth of the publication” (Varanese v. Gall 1988).
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The thrust of Varanese’s argument was that the Gall had ready access to 
information that should have brought about questions as to the truthfulness of 
the advertisement, or that should have prompted some form of investigation 
into its accuracy (Varanese v. Gall 1988). The court stated that while the 
allegations, if true, might raise the issue of negligence, they did not reach the 
level of showing actual malice (Varanese v. Gall 1988). The court reasoned that 
political advertisements, unlike news stories, are not generated from within a 
media organization, which should diminish the responsibility of the media for 
verifying the accuracy of any statements contained in such advertisements 
{Varanese v. Gall 1988). The failure to check the truth of a statement is not 
enough of a basis to raise the issue of actual malice unless the statement is 
“facially incredible” or the defendant had a “subjective reason” to question the 
reliability of a source {Varanese v. Gall 1988). Because the record did not 
contain any evidence that Gall had any subjective reason to doubt the reliability 
of the sources of the advertisement, the court concluded that there was no 
evidence of actual malice on his part (Varanese v. Gall 1988).
The case of Cronley v. Pensacola News-Joumal was similar to Varanese in 
that it involved a public official political candidate who brought forth a libel 
action against a newspaper that had published an article and an advertisement 
that were, in the appellant’s opinion, defamatory {Cronley v. Pensacola News- 
Joumal 1990). The first district of the Florida Court of Appeals held in May
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of 1990 that since the appellant was a public figure and had to prove actual 
malice on the part of the newspaper, the trial court was proper in dismissing the 
case in favor of the newspaper because the “undisputed material facts failed to 
reveal a basis for a jury to render a verdict in the appellant’s favor” {Cronley v. 
Pensacola News-Joumall990). The court stated that both the appellee’s 
advertising director and executive editor acted in good faith to publish truthful 
statements by providing background evidence as to the validity of the 
advertisement’s allegations {Cronley v. Pensacola News-Joumal 1990). Since it 
could not be shown with convincing clarity that the allegedly defamatory 
statements were made with actual malice, the court affirmed the trial court’s 
summary judgement motion for the appellee newspaper {Cronley v. Pensacola 
News-Joumal 1990).
A libel action was also at the heart of a case heard by the Alabama 
Supreme Court in July of 1992. In Camp v. Yeager, the appellee advertising 
agency (Yeager) produced a televised political advertisement that, according to 
the court record, contained statements that the agency knew were false {Camp 
v. Yeager 1992). The commercial was challenged as being defamatory because 
it stated that the public “got hit with three rate increases” while the appellant 
was the president of the Alabama Public Service Commission (APSC) and that 
“as a reward”, the appellant received over $760,000 in consultant fees {Camp v. 
Yeager 1992). The court record illuminated the fact that Camp voted against all
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three rate increases and that such increases are not granted under the control of
the APSC, but only pursuant to state court orders (Camp v. Yeager 1992).
Furthermore, the fact that he received over $700,000 in consulting fees did not
arise directly due to his service as a public service commissioner (Camp v. Yeager
1992). After Camp left the APSC, he opened his own consulting firm and he
entered into a three-year contract with Georgia Power Company to perform
economic development work, labor relations consulting, and consulting on
public relations and regulatory affairs involving nuclear generation of electric
power (Camp v. Yeager 1992).
The Alabama Supreme Court held that such statements, obviously made
without the necessary background knowledge, were capable of having
defamatory meanings (Camp v. Yeager 1992). The court relied on the reasoning
it set forth in the case of Loveless v. Graddick:
The test to factually determine the defamatory nature of a statement is 
that meaning would be ascribed to the language by the reader or listener 
of average or ordinary intelligence, or by a common mind (Camp v. 
Yeager 1992).
The court stated that because the appellant was a public figure, a false or 
defamatory statement may be made intentionally and with ill will toward the 
public figure, but the public figure may be ineligible for a remedy if the 
statement was made without the knowledge of its falsity or without “reckless 
disregard” of its validity (Camp v. Yeager 1992). This rule, brought forth in the
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case of Mobile Press Register, Inc. v. Faulkner, is based on the rationale espoused 
by the Supreme Court in Garrison v. Louisiana (Camp v. Yeager 1992). The 
Garrison Court held that debate on public issues should not be inhibited if the 
speaker runs the risk that what he may say will be brought to court in order 
to prove that he spoke out of hatred (Camp v. Yeager 1992). Such statements 
that are honestly believed by a public official, even if spoken out of hatred, 
contribute to the “free exchange of ideas and the ascertainment of tru th” (Camp 
v. Yeager 1992).
Based on the former court ruling, the Alabama Supreme Court decided 
that the trial court erred in granting the advertising agency summary judgement 
because the appellant presented evidence that was “clear and convincing” enough 
for a jury to “reasonably determine” that the agency knew that the statements 
made in the televised political advertisement were false (Camp v. Yeager 1992).
The court was not unanimous in its decision in the Camp case and 
Justice Maddox’s dissenting opinion is worthy of discussion. Maddox explained 
how the case of New York Times v. Sullivan should be the controlling legal 
guideline (Camp v. Yeager 1992). Maddox argued that,-even if the appellant was 
able to prove that the television commercial contained a false statement and that 
it was defamatory, “public officials and political candidates . . . should be men 
[and women] of fortitude” and should not expect to  be protected from the 
harshness of the political arena (Camp v. Yeager 1992). Thus, Maddox stated,
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such public officials should not be entitled to a trial on the issues (Camp v. 
Yeager 1992).
Maddox cited how the Supreme Court in New York Times v. Sullivan 
came extremely close to declaring that political speech, even speech that is false 
and defamatory, had absolute protection under the First Amendment (Camp v. 
Yeager 1992). New York Times v. Sullivan was decided, as the Supreme Court 
expressed it,
[A]gainst the background of a profound national commitment to the 
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and 
wide open, and that it may well contain vehement, caustic, and 
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks upon government and public 
officials (Camp v. Yeager 1992).
Maddox further made the case that “the substance of the television 
commercial was not materially different” from the newspaper story of the same 
facts (Camp v. Yeager 1992). The court record depicted how the appellee created 
the television commercial content, in part, on information that appeared in two 
published articles (Camp v. Yeager 1992). In comparing the news accounts with 
the television commercial, Maddox concluded that the “implication and 
innuendos” were essentially the same between the two (Camp v. Yeager 1992). 
Both forms of communication referred to a former public service commissioner 
who “received $770,000 from a sister company of a company he regulated” 
when he served as the president of the Alabama Public Service Commission
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(Camp v. Yeager 1992). Maddox went on to state that even if the “implications
and innuendos” among the two were different, the
. . . television commercial was just the kind of protected political speech 
that the Supreme Court of the United States found to be protected in 
New York Times v. Sullivan (Camp v. Yeager 1992).
Maddox then expressed how he would affirm the summary judgement ruling of
the trial court because he believed that the appellant failed to show that he
could prove, in a clear and convincing manner, that the appellee’s speech was
not protected by the First Amendment (Camp v. Yeager 1992).
A R eturn t o  th e  Fairness D octr in e  
The Supreme Court was the forum in which two cases that dealt with 
the “fairness doctrine” were heard. During political campaigns, the fairness 
doctrine refers to the treatment that the media are required to give those 
candidates seeking office. Generally speaking, the fairness doctrine would apply 
in a case in which a story aired that presented the views of one of the two 
candidates in a race without presenting the views of the opponent. In such a 
situation, the fairness doctrine requires that both candidates’ views receive 
treatment by the media. Of course, the fairness doctrine comes into play in 
cases that do not involve political candidates, as well. The combined case of 
Red Lion Broadcasting, Co. v. Federal Communications Commission and U.S. v. 
Radio Television News Directors Association allowed the Supreme Court to 
analyze the fairness doctrine.
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The case arose when the plaintiff, Red Lion Broadcasting, the operator 
of a radio station in Pennsylvania, aired a fifteen-minute broadcast on November 
27,1964 (Red Lion Broadcasting, Co. v. Federal Communications Commission and 
U.S. v. Radio Television News Directors Association 1969; hereafter Red Lion and 
RTNDA  1969). During the broadcast, Reverend Billy James Hargis discussed a 
book written by Fred J. Cook titled Goldwater—Extremist on the Right (Red 
Lion and RTNDA  1969). Hargis stated that Cook had been fired by a 
newspaper as a result of false charges made against city officials, that Cook had 
worked for a communist-affiliated publication, that he defended Alger Hiss and 
attacked J. Edgar Hoover and the CIA, and now Cook had written a book to 
“smear and destroy” Barry Goldwater (Red Lion and RTNDA  1969). In 
response, Cook demanded reply time and the station refused (Red Lion and 
RTNDA 1969).
The FCC determined that the broadcast constituted a personal attack on 
Cook and that the station failed to meet its obligation under the fairness 
doctrine to send a tape, transcript, or summary of the broadcast to Cook and 
offer him reply time (Red Lion and RTNDA  1969). The Court of Appeals 
upheld the FCC’s position and the Supreme Court affirmed, stating that the 
specific application of the fairness doctrine in Red Lion was authorized by 
Congress (Red Lion and RTNDA  1969).
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The Radio Television News Directors Association (RTNDA) portion of the 
case involved a new rule adopted by the FCC to make the personal attack 
aspect of the fairness doctrine more precise and enforceable (Red Lion and 
RTNDA  1969). RTNDA  also sought to specify the rules relating to political 
editorials deemed to be unconstitutional (Red Lion and RTNDA  1969). The 
Supreme Court held that the specific application of the fairness doctrine, 
authorized by Congress, served to enhance—rather than abridge—freedoms of 
speech and the press protected by the First Amendment (Red Lion and RTNDA 
1969).
The “new rule” required that when views were presented on controver­
sial issues of public importance, any attack made on the “honesty, character, 
integrity or like personal qualities of an identified person or group” will 
mandate that the station licensee inform the recipient of the attack within at 
least one week (RedLion and RTNDA  1969). The date, time, and identification 
of the broadcast and a script, tape, or accurate summary of the broadcast must 
be made available to the “attackee,” along with an offer of a reasonable 
opportunity to respond using the licensee’s facilities (Red Lion and RTNDA  
1969). The rule applies to: Attacks on foreign groups or foreign public figures; 
personal attacks made by a candidate, authorized spokesperson or any other 
person associated with the campaign on another candidate; attacks presented
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during newscasts, news interviews or on-the-spot news coverage (Red Lion and 
RTNDA  1969).
When the situation arises where a licensee editorially endorses or opposes 
a legally qualified candidate or candidates, the licensee, within a day after the 
editorial is aired, must notify the candidate attacked as well as the other 
candidate or candidates in the race (Red Lion and RTNDA  1969). Editorials 
aired within 72 hours before the election must make the necessary allowances 
for timely responses to be made by the attacked candidate or other candidates 
in the race (Red Lion and RTNDA  1969).
The Court held that, without the fairness doctrine, a licensee could have 
the ability to ban all campaign appearances by candidates themselves from the 
air and deliver only the views of candidates supported by the broadcaster to the 
exclusion of all other candidates (Red Lion and RTNDA 1969). The fairness 
doctrine serves to prohibit the broadcaster from exerting such a dominating 
control over the exposure of candidates by the broadcaster in a given election 
(Red Lion and RTNDA  1969).
The fairness doctrine was also at issue in the joint cases of Columbia 
Broadcasting System v. Democratic National Committee, Federal Communications 
Commission v. Business Executives' Move For Vietnam Peace, Post-Newsweek 
Stations v. Business Executives' Move For Vietnam Peace, and American Broadcast­
ing Companies v. Democratic National Committee [to be cited as CBS v. DNC\.
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In these cases, the fairness doctrine was examined by the Federal Communica­
tions Commission, which declared that the policy of radio and television 
licensees of not selling editorial advertising time was not in violation of the 
Federal Communications Act of 1934, nor was it a violation of the First 
Amendment (CBS v. D NC  1973). The plaintiffs held that responsible 
individuals had a right to purchase editorial advertisement time to comment on 
public issues without worrying if the broadcaster was in compliance with the 
fairness doctrine (CBS v. D NC  1973).
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the FCC and stated that 
the broadcasters’ policy of refusing paid editorial time violated the First 
Amendment, as other sorts of paid commercial advertisements were permissible 
(CBS v. D N C  1973). The United States Supreme Court reversed the Court of 
Appeals and the Court majority was in agreement with the reasoning of the 
FCC (CSS v. DNC  1973).
Parts I, II, and IV constituted the majority opinion of the Court (Id. at 
735). To begin with, Justice Burger, writing for the majority, stated that a case 
based on First Amendment grounds must be evaluated within the statutory and 
regulatory scheme that had been developed over the years by the decisions 
rendered in the Congress and by the FCC (CBS v. DNC  1973). In the past, 
Congress had consistently rejected attempts to impose a “common carrier” right 
of access to broadcaster facilities for any and all individuals seeking to express
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their views on public issues (CBS v. D NC  1973). The fairness doctrine came 
into being to require that broadcasters’ coverage of important public issues be 
adequate enough so that differing viewpoints could be reflected (CBS v. DNC  
1973). Further, the majority went on to proclaim that no private individual or 
group could command the use of broadcast facilities (CBS v. DNC  1973).
The Court expressed that the public interest standard of the Communica­
tions Act, within which First Amendment principles are contained, did not go 
so far as to require broadcasters to accept editorial advertisements (CBS v. DNC  
1973). According to the Court, the FCC was correct in deciding that the public 
interest in having a “marketplace” sort of access for ideas and experiences would 
not be satisfied by ordering a right of access to advertising time (CBS v. DNC  
1973). There was an inherent risk that such a system would be monopolized 
by those who could afford air time costs and, thus, the operation of the fairness 
doctrine would be “undermined” (CBS v. D NC  1973). The public accountability 
on the broadcaster would be diluted (CBS v. DNC  1973).
Such an absolute right of access would require the FCC to be involved 
on a case-by-case basis in deciding who should be heard and when, which would 
have the effect of dramatically increasing the involvement of the government in 
broadcasting operations (CBS v. DNC  1973). The Court stated that the public 
interest dictates that a substantial degree of journalistic discretion must remain 
with broadcasters (CBS v. D NC  1973).
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Justice Stewart, who concurred with the majority, made the separate 
point that since private broadcasters were, as members of the press, protected 
by the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of the press, it would be 
unnecessary to hold that First Amendment protection of free speech required 
the government to impose controls, as sought in this case, to protect First 
Amendment values (CBS v. DNC  1973). If private broadcasters were considered 
a part of the government, then the private newspapers and their freedoms of the 
press would likewise be gone (CBS v. DNC  1973). According to Stewart, under 
the public interest standards of the Communications Act, the FCC was not 
incorrect in refusing to require that every broadcaster must accept paid, public- 
issue advertising (CBS v. DNC  1973).
In their dissenting opinion, Justices Brennan and Marshall began by 
explaining that the public nature of the airwaves, the Federal licensing of 
broadcasters, the regulation of programming, and the FCC’s specific approval 
of broadcasters’ absolute bans against accepting editorial advertisements are all 
actions taken by the government and are, therefore, subject to the auspices of 
the First Amendment (CBS v. DNC  1973). The fairness doctrine, in their 
opinion, was not sufficient to satisfy the First Amendment interests between 
individuals and the public in an uninhibited exchange of views on items of a 
controversial nature that concerned matters of public importance (CBS v. DNC
1973). When the interests and First Amendment rights of the broadcasters, the
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public as a whole, and individuals wishing to express their views are all weighed 
against each other, the ban on all editorial advertisements violates the First 
Amendment (CBS v. D NC  1973). Such a ban, according to the dissenters, is 
particularly hard to swallow because the same air time is available for 
commercial advertisers (CBS v. DNC  1973). The justices believed that the Court 
of Appeals decided the case correctly when they left broad latitude to the FCC 
and the licensees to develop reasonable regulations to govern a limited right of 
access for editorial advertising (CBS v. DNC  1973).
R easonable Access 
The Supreme Court was also the venue for the joint cases of CBS v. 
FCC, ABC  v. FCC, and NBC  v. FCC, where these three television networks 
petitioned the Court for review of FCC orders holding that they had failed to 
meet their obligation to allow for reasonable access by federal candidates for the 
purchase of broadcast time (CBS v. FCC, ABC  v. FCC, NBC  v. FCC 1981).
O n October 11, 1979, the Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee 
requested that each of the three major networks provide time for a paid thirty- 
minute program sometime between 8:00 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. on any day from 
the fourth through the seventh of December 1979 (CBS v. FCC, ABC  v. FCC, 
NBC  v. FCC 1981). It was the intention of the Committee to present, in 
conjunction with the formal announcement of President Carter’s candidacy, a
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documentary that was to outline the record of his administration (CBS v. FCC, 
ABC  v. FCC, NBC  v. FCC 1981).
All three networks refused to provide the requested time to the 
Committee (CBS v. FCC, ABC  v. FCC, NBC  v. FCC 1981). CBS stated that 
there were many candidates in the field competing for the presidential 
nomination and that the potential disruption of regular programming in order 
to allow for requests for equal treatment was significant. But, CBS did offer to 
sell a five-minute segment at 10:55 p.m. on December 8, and an additional five- 
minute segment in the daytime (CBS v. FCC, ABC  v. FCC, NBC  v. FCC 1981). 
ABC indicated that it had not determined when it would begin selling political 
time for the 1980 presidential campaign, but it later decided that it would 
permit such sales in January 1980 (CBS v. FCC, ABC  v. FCC, NBC  v. FCC 
1981). NBC also expressed that it was not prepared to sell time for political 
programs as early as December of 1979, as the potential existed for so many 
time requests for the several candidates (CBS v. FCC, ABC  v. FCC, NBC  v. FCC 
1981).
The Carter-Mondale Committee filed a complaint with the FCC charging 
that the networks had violated their obligation to provide “reasonable access” 
under Section 312(a)(7), part of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971,
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which authorizes the FCC to revoke any broadcasting station license,
. . . for willful or repeated failure to allow reasonable access to or to 
permit purchase of reasonable amounts of time for the use of a broadcast 
station by a legally-qualified candidate for Federal elective office on 
behalf of his candidacy (CBS v. FCC, ABC  v. FCC, NBC  v. FCC 1981).
The FCC, in their ruling, held that the networks had violated the statute
and that their reasons for refusing to sell the time requested were “deficient”
under the FCC’s standard of reasonableness (CBS v. FCC, ABC  v. FCC, NBC
v. FCC 1981). At the time of their decision, the FCC directed the networks to
indicate, by a specified date, exactly the manner in which they intended to
fulfill their statutory obligation (CBS v. FCC, ABC  v. FCC, NBC  v. FCC 1981).
The Supreme Court stated that when the FCC is faced with reviewing
a decision that a broadcaster has made in terms of whether to provide the
requested time or not, only two questions are to be considered:
(1) Has the broadcaster adverted to the proper standards in deciding 
whether to grant a request for access, and
(2) Is the broadcaster’s explanation for his decision reasonable in 
terms of those standards (CBS v. FCC, ABC  v. FCC, NBC  v. FCC 
1981)?
The Court commented that the legislative history confirmed that Section 
312(a)(7) created a vehicle that enlarged the scope of the political broadcasting 
responsibilities of licensees (CBS v. FCC, ABC  v. FCC, NBC  v. FCC 1981). The 
report of the Senate Commerce Committee stated that one of the key purposes 
of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 was,
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. . .  to give candidates for public office greater access to the media so that 
they may better explain their stand on the issues, and thereby more fully 
and completely inform the voters (CBS v. FCC, ABC  v. FCC, NBC v. 
FCC 1981).
Indeed, the Court noted that the legislative history supports the plain 
meaning of the statute in that individual candidates for federal elective office 
have a right of reasonable access to the use of stations for paid political 
broadcasts on behalf of their candidacies without regard to whether an opponent 
has secured time as well (CBS v. FCC, ABC  v. FCC, NBC  v. FCC 1981).
The Court continued in its reasoning to state that Section 312(a)(7) 
makes a significant contribution to freedom of expression by enhancing the 
ability of candidates to present to the public the information necessary for the 
effective operation of the democratic process (CBS v. FCC, ABC  v. FCC, NBC 
v. FCC 1981). The statute represented an effort by Congress to guarantee that 
a resource as important as the airwaves be used in the interest of the public 
(CBS v. FCC, ABC  v. FCC, NBC  v. FCC 1981). The Court concluded that this 
statutory right of access “properly balances the First Amendment rights of 
Federal candidates, the public and broadcaster” (CBS v. FCC, ABC  v. FCC, NBC 
v. FCC 1981).
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Low est-unit-charge  
During a political campaign, candidates are faced with the challenge of 
trying to get their message across to the voters. Often, laws are passed that help 
to facilitate this process. An interesting case out of Florida, Gore Newspapers 
Company v. Shevin, involved newspaper publishers who sought to declare two 
Florida state statutes unconstitutional because they had the effect of requiring 
newspapers and broadcasters to charge political candidates the lowest local 
advertising rate, and prohibited the airing or printing of any item on election 
day that could be perceived as an attack “against the candidate” (Gore Newspa­
pers Company v. Shevin 1975). The plaintiffs in this case were newspaper 
publishers who believed that the two statute requirements were in violation of 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution (Gore Newspapers 
Company v. Shevin 1975).
The defendant, Shevin, was the attorney general for the State of Florida 
and had issued a series of opinions as to the constitutionality of the statutes and 
their applicability to the plaintiffs (Gore Newspapers Company v. Shevin 1975). 
The defendant also stated, by letter, that the statutes would be enforced against 
the plaintiffs if they were ever violated, and that criminal proceedings would be 
instituted (Gore Newspapers Company v. Shevin 1975).
Prevailing business practice was that the lowest local rate charged by the 
plaintiffs went into effect only when a client contracted to purchase 25,000
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column-inches during a period of one year (Gore Newspapers Company v. Shevin
1975). Political candidates were charged the same rates—higher, or less 
discounted—that other, less frequent advertisers were charged (Gore Newspapers 
Company v. Shevin 1975).
Chapter 106 of the Florida statutes stated that publishers and broadcast­
ers may not charge a political candidate any more than the “lowest local rate” 
available to advertisers (Gore Newspapers Company v. Shevin 1975). The statute 
also held that no one political candidate could be charged more for advertising 
than any other political candidate (Gore Newspapers Company v. Shevin 1975). 
A violation of the statute would entail a fine to the guilty corporation of 
$10,000, along with a “forfeiture of its right to do business in the state” (Gore 
Newspapers Company v. Shevin 1975).
While the plaintiffs argued that the statute was created by politicians to 
give politicians a preferred status, the state countered that the statute was a valid 
exercise of the state’s police power to allow those individuals who may be 
otherwise financially prevented from seeking public office the opportunity to 
do so (Gore Newspapers Company v. Shevin 1975). The plaintiffs also stated that 
the economic regulation imposed by the statute with its limitation upon 
advertising revenue makes the press “vulnerable to be ‘taxed’ out of existence 
or into silence” (Gore Newspapers Company v. Shevin 1975).
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The U.S. Florida District Court ruled that the statute did not compel the
plaintiffs to print advertisements for the candidates, but that it only required
that the rate for the advertisements must be at the lowest local advertising rate
(Gore Newspapers Company v. Shevin 1975). The publisher or broadcaster was
free to decline all political advertising if it was not profitable (Gore Newspapers
Company v. Shevin 1975). According to the court,
If the loss of revenue would prove to be significant, the newspapers 
might very well decide to decline all political advertising, thus severely 
limiting media access for all candidates whether well-heeled or running 
on a shoestring (Gore Newspapers Company v. Shevin 1975).
The effort of the legislature in its attempt to make news media
advertising available to candidates was commendable, stated the court, but the
exercise of the state’s police power had been the subject of several statutes that
restrained the content of the publication, and which had been struck down by
the Supreme Court (Gore Newspapers Company v. Shevin 1975). The mere fact
that the restraint in this case was aimed at revenue instead of content did not
insulate it from the “binds” of the First Amendment (Gore Newspapers Company
v. Shevin 1975). Thus, the First Amendment prior restraints by the government
extended to the lessening of advertising revenue, making the lowest local rate
provision invalid (Gore Newspapers Company v. Shevin 1975).
The state of Texas also treated particular aspects of the lowest-unit-charge
rule in a unique fashion. This is apparent in the case of KVUE  v. Moore.
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A Texas statute that allowed for year-round lowest unit rate political 
advertising was at issue in this case (KVUE v. Moore 1983). The Fifth Circuit 
of the United States Court of Appeals held that the Texas statute was 
unconstitutional because it applied year-round, thereby widening the scope of 
the advertising rate provisions of the Communications Act Section 315, and 
further applying the discounted rates to both candidate and issue-oriented 
political advertising (KVUE v. Moore 1983). The FCC was deemed responsible 
for the enforcement of Section 315, which allows the lowest unit rate charge 45 
days before a primary election and 60 days before a general election (KVUE v. 
Moore 1983). The Texas statute, Article 14.09(B), prohibited radio and television 
stations from charging a rate for political advertising that is more than the 
lowest unit charged to the station’s “most favored advertisers” for the same class, 
condition and duration of time (KVUE v. Moore 1983).
In reviewing the legislative history of the Communications Act Section 
315, the court held that Congress and the FCC intentionally limited the scope 
of the Act to require broadcasters to charge the lowest unit rate to candidates 
and their campaign committees only (KVUE v. Moore 1983). According to the 
court,
This extension of the statute’s coverage to noncandidates and the lowest- 
unit-charge to a year-round rule stands as an obstacle to the achievement 
of Congress’ purpose in enacting the rate regulation statute (KVUE v. 
Moore 1983).
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The Texas statute had the effect of conflicting with the Federal statute 
by lengthening—rather than shortening—the campaign season (KVUE v. Moore 
1983). It also brought about greater campaign spending by encouraging 
candidates and noncandidates (issues) to advertise on a year-round basis (KVUE 
v. Moore 1983). Finally, the Texas statute imposed a heavier burden on 
broadcasters to make these lower rates available year-round (KVUE v. Moore 
1983). The court declared the Texas statute unconstitutional by means of the 
Supremacy Clause because the Federally-enacted legislation supersedes legislation 
passed at the state level (KVUE v. Moore 1983).
Censorship
The second aspect of the case of Gore Newspapers Company v. Shevin 
dealt with a prohibition against publishing attacks against a candidate on the day 
of the election. The plaintiffs stipulated that material published in its election- 
day edition of the newspaper may have included old charges or adverse 
information about candidates that may have been considered to be attacks 
against the candidates (Gore Newspapers Company v. Shevin 1975). Section 104 
of the Florida statutes was written with the intent of preventing any last minute 
“smear tactics” against candidates, and the law had existed without being 
questioned since 1909 (Gore Newspapers Company v. Shevin 1975).
The plaintiffs argued that the requirement that forbade publishing any 
negative attacks against a candidate should be declared unconstitutional based
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on the decision rendered in the case of Mills v. Alabama (Gore Newspapers 
Company v. Shevin 1975). In Mills, the Supreme Court held that an Alabama 
law, which made it a crime to “solicit any votes in support of or in opposition 
to any proposition” on the day of the election, was unconstitutional as it 
violated the First Amendment (Gore Newspapers Company v. Shevin 1975). In 
that case, an editor of an Alabama newspaper was arrested after an editorial 
advocating a particular proposition was printed on election day (Gore 
Newspapers Company v. Shevin 1975).
The district court was in agreement with the plaintiffs. It ruled the 
Florida statute fit nicely within the parameter of the Mills decision and, 
therefore, declared Section 104 of the Florida state statutes unconstitutional as 
a violation of the First Amendment (Gore Newspapers Company v. Shevin 1975). 
The court felt that the newspapers and broadcasters should be free to print or 
air whatever they chose regarding a candidate on election day and that they 
should not be censored, which the existing law had the capability of doing 
(Gore Newspapers Company v. Shevin 1975).
The issue of censorship also involved the broadcast medium in the case 
of Kuczo v. Western Connecticut Broadcasting. In Kuczo, the Connecticut 
District Court concluded, in 1976, that a radio station’s review and censorship 
of two mayoral candidates’ political advertisements constituted Federal action 
subject to  the First Amendment (Kuczo v. Western Connecticut Broadcasting
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1976). The case arose during the 1969 Stamford, Connecticut, mayoral election 
when two of the three candidates—plaintiffs Kuczo and Nocerino—had their 
radio political advertisement scripts reviewed and edited by the defendant radio 
station’s general manager prior to airing (Kuczo v. Western Connecticut 
Broadcasting 1976). Schwartz, the station’s general manager, did not review or 
edit the audio scripts of the third candidate, who was ultimately elected to office 
(Kuczo v. Western Connecticut Broadcasting 1976).
The FCC conducted a hearing after a complaint was submitted to the 
regulatory agency by the plaintiffs (Kuczo v. Western Connecticut Broadcasting 
1976). The FCC ruled that the radio station’s review and censorship of the 
candidates’ scripts were a “flagrant violation” of Section 315(a) of the Communi­
cation Act of 1934, and the defendants were fined $10,000 (Kuczo v. Western 
Connecticut Broadcasting 1976). In the case before the Connecticut court, the 
defendants maintained that no violation of the First Amendment occurred as the 
plaintiffs alleged because there was no “governmental action” taken since the 
station was a private operator, not an entity of the government (Kuczo v. 
Western Connecticut Broadcasting 1976).
The Connecticut District Court stated that the core question in this case, 
which had yet to be officially resolved in any forum, involved to what extent 
actions taken by broadcasters who are licensed and regulated by the FCC—a 
governmental agency—rise to a level to which they may be classified as
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constituting Federal action (Kuczo v. Western Connecticut Broadcasting 1976).
The court followed the reasoning of the Supreme Court in that court’s decision
in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. where the Court held that,
[T]he inquiry must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between 
the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the 
action of the latter may be as fairly treated as that of the State itself 
{Kuczo v. Western Connecticut Broadcasting 1976).
The district court held that the Federal government ensured that one
radio station licensee would have a monopoly of the Stamford airwaves and
that, if a candidate wanted to reach eligible voters over the radio, defendant’s
WSTC-AM and WSTC-FM were the most natural and effective vehicles
available {Kuczo v. Western Connecticut Broadcasting 1976). In effect, by
granting the defendants a monopoly control over the airwaves, the FCC has
invested Western Connecticut Broadcasting with the ability to obstruct free
speech in the local elections {Kuczo v. Western Connecticut Broadcasting 1976).
The court continued in its reasoning to state how the essence of a
monopoly is a prime concern of the First Amendment {Kuczo v. Western
Connecticut Broadcasting 1976). Because the government delegated its control
over the local airways to a single radio station licensee, the opportunity for
abuses created by the monopoly that the First Amendment was specifically
designed to prohibit are obvious {Kuczo v. Western Connecticut Broadcasting
1976). Simply because the station’s general manager was not a government
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employee does not allow him to avoid his constitutional responsibility as he
functions at his position under the auspices of a governmental license (Kuczo v.
Western Connecticut Broadcasting 1976). The court ruled that,
. . .  it is this nexus between the governmental regulation and the 
constitutional right in issue that imbues the defendant’s action with 
governmental character vis-a-vis that right {Kuczo v. Western Connecticut 
Broadcasting 1976).
Indeed, it is the government’s restrictions on competitive entry that magnify the 
impact which its licensee ’ s decisions can have on free speech.
The Power o f  th e  Press 
Can a newspaper legally adhere to a policy of not publishing paid 
political advertisements on the day prior to the general election? The case of 
Citizen Awareness Regarding Education v. Calhoun County Publishing, Inc., dealt 
with precisely that concern. In the case, a West Virginia trial court order, 
which required the newspaper to publish a paid political advertisement 
submitted by a local political action committee, was found to be a violation of 
the First Amendment guarantee of a free press {Citizen Awareness Regarding 
Education v. Calhoun County Publishing, Inc. 1991).
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals ruled that the government 
can never require a private newspaper to print anything without violating the 
First Amendment {Citizen Awareness Regarding Education v. Calhoun County 
Publishing, Inc. 1991). The court record indicated that the newspaper had
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printed previous advertisements from the Citizens Awareness Regarding 
Education political action committee—a group formed in order to oppose a local 
school bond issue—but the paper refused to print an ad on May 3, 1991, because 
they had a policy of not printing any political ads in the last issue prior to an 
election (Citizen Awareness Regarding Education v. Calhoun County Publishing, 
Inc. 1991). While the trial court granted an injunction on May 1, 1991, forcing 
the newspaper to publish the advertisement, there existed no legal support for 
the injunction sought by the political action committee and, thus, the granting 
of the injunction was a violation of the First Amendment (Citizen Awareness 
Regarding Education v. Calhoun County Publishing, Inc. 1991).
Monetary Limitations on Media Advertising
The issue of media advertising costs was again raised in the case of 
Abercrombie v. Bums. However, unlike Gore, Abercrombie involved state- 
imposed limitations on the amount of money political candidates could spend 
in the news media (Abercrombie v. Bums 1974). The plaintiffs brought the suit 
on the grounds that the statute was a violation of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments {Abercrombie v. Bums 1974).
Hawaii Act 185 limited the amount of money a political candidate could 
spend during the course of an election, and set limits on the amount of money 
that could be spent in the news media (Abercrombie v. Bums 1974). The 
purpose behind the limits in the expenditure provision was to permit potential
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candidates of limited means to seek office (Abercrombie v. Bums 1974). A 
standing committee report indicated that there must be an implementation of 
the principle of equal opportunity in order to participate in the political process 
{Abercrombie v. Bums 1974).
According to the Hawaii U.S. District Court, the equal opportunity 
element was fulfilled by the limitation on the total amount of campaign 
expenditure as stated in Subsection ll-206(a) {Abercrombie v. Bums 1974). 
Limitations on the amount of advertising a candidate wished to spend on the 
newspapers, magazines, and radio and television, as stated in Subsection (b), was 
simply an additional, unwarranted burden {Abercrombie v. Bums 1974). But, a 
law that infringes on free speech requires more than a rational basis to uphold 
it {Abercrombie v. Bums 1974). Clearly, the court stated, the requirement 
imposed by Subsection (b) infringed on political speech {Abercrombie v. Bums
1974). The fact that a political announcement may be purchased in a news 
media cannot force it into a category of lower-grade protection (Abercrombie v. 
Bums 1974). The distinction is between speech that is profit-motivated 
(commercial), and speech that has an informational intent (political) (Abercrom­
bie v. Bums 1974).
The Abercrombie court made reference to the case of U.S. v. O ’Brien, 
which established the test to judge the limitations on media expenditures 
{Abercrombie v. Bums 1974). The four test criteria were set as follows:
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(1) A government requirement is justified if it is within the constitu­
tional power of the government.
(2) The requirement is justified if it furthers an important govern­
mental interest.
(3) The requirement is justified if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression.
(4) The requirement is justified if incidental restrictions on the
alleged First Amendment freedoms are no greater than necessary 
to further that interest (Abercrombie v. Bums 1974).
According to the court, Act 185 satisfied the first three criteria, but failed 
on the fourth (Abercrombie v. Bums 1974). The restriction of Subsection (b) of 
the Act on First Amendment freedoms, on its face, appeared to be greater than 
necessary to promote the principle of equality of opportunity to take part in the 
political process (Abercrombie v. Bums 1974). This interest was amply protected 
under Subsection ll-206(a), and the additional limitation created by Subsection 
(b) on expenditures for advertising appeared to be an unjustifiable infringement 
of the First Amendment freedoms (Abercrombie v. Bums 1974).
Limitations on  Corporate Political Activity
Federal campaign regulations have limited the ability of corporations to 
participate in the political arena by prohibiting contributions made by 
corporations to political candidates. However, a Montana state statute, at issue 
in the case of C&C Plywood v. Hanson, which forbade corporations or banks 
from making contributions in order to promote or defeat a ballot issue, was
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declared an unconstitutional limitation of the corporation’s or bank’s First 
Amendment rights (C&C Plywood v. Hanson 1990).
The N inth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the corporation’s rights 
to express their views on “issues of general public interest” may not be abridged 
by the state unless a compelling state interest is shown to exist (C&C Plywood 
v. Hanson 1990). The court stated that when corporations seek to influence the 
electorate and not an individual candidate or party, no such state interest exists 
because corporate activities cannot create political debts like those contemplated 
in the case of Buckley v. Valeo, which had the effect of limiting overall spending 
in Federal political campaigns (C&C Plywood v. Hanson 1990). Just because a 
corporation’s involvement may influence the outcome of a vote does not 
adequately support the need to suppress corporate speech (C&C Plywood v. 
Hanson 1990). Since the Montana statute had the effect of totally prohibiting 
any contributions or payments, it was not “minimally regulatory,” but “totally 
prescriptive and therefore overbroad” (C&C Plywood v. Hanson 1990).
The court concluded that the portion of the Montana statute that 
forbade payments or contributions by corporations in support of or in 
opposition to  ballot issues was an unconstitutional restriction of the corpora­
tion’s First Amendment rights (C&C Plywood v. Hanson 1990). The court 
further stated that, while regulations to ensure disclosure of the source of 
payments or contributions may be enacted without a showing of a compelling
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state interest, the complete suppression of expression created by the Montana 
statute was overbroad and, thus, impermissible {C&C Plywood v. Hanson 1990).
Corporate political activity was also at issue in the case of Austin v. 
Michigan Chamber o f Commerce in which the Supreme Court held, in 1990, a 
Michigan statute constitutional, even though it limited political speech, because 
it was narrowly tailored and served a compelling state interest {Austin v. 
Michigan Chamber o f Commerce 1990). Austin involved an advertisement the 
Michigan Chamber of Commerce wanted to place in a publication in order to 
advocate the candidacy of Richard Bardstra to the Michigan House of 
Representatives {Austin v. Michigan Chamber o f Commerce 1990). The Chamber 
was prevented from running the advertisement because of Section 54(1) of the 
Michigan Campaign Financial Act, which prohibited all corporations from using 
general treasury funds toward state political expenditures (Austin v. Michigan 
Chamber o f Commerce 1990).
The advertisement was not run at the direction of the Bardstra campaign, 
rather the advertisement was to be an “independent expenditure” which was not 
made at “the direction of, or under control of, another person” (Geary 1992). 
The Chamber was a nonprofit organization of about 8,000 members whose 
activities included “speakfing] out on legislative, political, legal, economic, and 
social issues that effect the business community” (Geary 1992). Funding for the 
Chamber’s activities came from dues paid by all members to  the general
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treasury, the same treasury that would have funded Bardstra’s advertisement 
(Geary 1992).
In his Boston University Law Review article, Sean T. Geary stated that 
Austin appeared to “foreclose the opportunity to make independent corporate 
political expenditures” (Geary 1992). Among the troubling reasoning, he 
continued, was the Court’s broad definition of corruption that was defined as 
“corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth,” a 
distinction that, the Court held, corporations could attain more easily than 
individuals (Geary 1992). According to Geary, the Court made this assumption 
without showing any actual proof of this effect (Geary 1992). He went on to 
state that,
The corrupting influence of independent corporate expenditures should 
be shown with some specificity to establish its allegedly greater degree 
of danger relative to independent expenditures by individuals. This 
showing would further explain the state interests that justify burdening 
corporate free speech, the constitutional status of which the Court also 
needs to define more adequately (Geary 1992).
The extent to which a newsletter is able to publish material that is 
highly critical of a presidential candidate was the focus in the case of Federal 
Election Committee v. Phillips Publishing. The respondent, Phillips Publishing, 
was the publisher of a newsletter called The Pink Sheet on the Left (Federal 
Election Committee v. Phillips Publishing 1981). The Pink Sheet was a for-profit 
newsletter that targeted a conservative audience of about 14,000, and it had been
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in publication for ten years (Federal Election Committee v. Phillips Publishing 
1981). The Pink Sheet—which served as a periodical not under the control of 
any party, candidate or committee—claimed exemption under Section 
431(a) (b)(7) of the United States Code, which provided that any promotional 
material distributed by such an agency not controlled by any political entity is 
exempt from any possible prosecution (Federal Election Committee v. Phillips 
Publishing 1981).
The particular issue of The Pink Sheet in question in this case was printed 
in early 1980 and distributed to subscribers and potential subscribers (Federal 
Election Committee v. Phillips Publishing 1981). The tone of the issue was one 
of an attack against the presidential candidacy of Senator Edward Kennedy 
(Federal Election Committee v. Phillips Publishing 1981).
The Kennedy Presidential Committee filed a complaint to the Federal 
Election Committee alleging that The Pink Sheet violated four Federal election 
laws (Federal Election Committee v. Phillips Publishing 1981). The Federal 
Election Committee, in turn, issued a “reason to believe” letter to Phillips 
Publishing stating that they may have violated Federal election laws (Federal 
Election Committee v. Phillips Publishing 1981). The Federal Election Committee 
believed that the following four statements from The Pink Sheet violated election 
laws:
(1) “We must stop Kennedy before he seizes the Presidency.”
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(2) “You can help with this effort to stop Kennedy.”
(3) “You learn how you can use this valuable information to help 
defeat Teddy Kennedy’s drive for the Presidency.”
(4) “Whether you are a man or woman, young or old, a business­
man, teacher, student, employer, union member, or government 
worker—you can actually help combat Teddy Kennedy and 
advance the cause of conservatism in America” (Federal Election 
Committee v. Phillips Publishing 1981).
The Federal Election Commission also thought that the edition of The 
Pink. Sheet was in the form of a “solicitation letter,” as it was not in the form 
of a news story, commentary, or editorial, thus excluding it from the Section 
431(a) (b)(1) press exemption {Federal Election Committee v. Phillips Publishing 
1981). The FEC alluded to the fact that The Pink Sheet was not printed with 
the traditional heading typeface, publication information legend, and, addition­
ally, it was addressed “Dear Friend” instead of “Dear Subscriber” {Federal 
Election Committee v. Phillips Publishing 1981).
When the FEC issued their “reason to believe” letter, they also issued a 
subpoena requesting that Phillips Publishing furnish the Commission informa­
tion to refute the alleged violations {Federal Election Committee v. Phillips 
Publishing 1981). The case at hand sought to resolve whether a district court 
order enforcing the FEC’s subpoena was justified. The court ultimately held 
that the enforcement of the subpoena was not permissible {Federal Election 
Committee v. Phillips Publishing 1981).
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The United States District Court ruled that the FEC did not challenge
the contention that Phillips Publishing was not owned or controlled by any one
political party or candidate {Federal Election Committee v. Phillips Publishing
1981). The court went on to declare that the fact that The Pink Sheet had been
published for ten years further confirms the fact that it was not simply
generated for this particular race {Federal Election Committee v. Phillips
Publishing 1981). In essence, the FEC’s complaint was based only on the
supposition that a violation may have occurred (Federal Election Committee v.
Phillips Publishing 1981).
The court was particularly concerned with the FEC’s subject matter
jurisdiction in this matter and they referred to the language of the Supreme
Court in the case of Sweezy v. New Hampshire when it said that,
. . . the power of compelling process [must] be carefully circumscribed 
when the investigative process tends to impinge on such highly sensitive 
areas of freedom of speech or press, freedom of political association, and 
freedom of communication of ideas {Federal Election Committee v. 
Phillips Publishing 1981).
The court concluded that since the FEC made no “threshold” showing 
that a violation may have occurred, and chat it was unlikely that one would be 
found, and since the danger exists that any further inquiry by the FEC might 
violate the respondent’s First Amendment freedoms, the FEC’s petition for 




Hawaii was the site of another case in which the Hawaii U.S. District 
Court decided a controversial case involving political advertising: Local 
politicians were prohibited from displaying campaign signs. Ross v. Goshi arose 
when the plaintiffs, a group of local politicians brought suit against Maui city 
officials to declare Maui City Ordinance 308 Section 3(a)(4), as amended by 
Maui County Ordinance 697, unconstitutional because the ordinance violates 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments {Ross v. Goshi 1972). Section 3(a)(4) 
prohibits all outdoor political campaign signs (other than signs identifying the 
headquarters of a political candidate) placed on real property, buildings, and 
structures in view of the general public {Ross v. Goshi 1972). The stated purpose 
of the section to limit the posting of signs was to “abate the traffic and fire 
hazards caused by the proliferation of such signs and to preserve the natural 
beauty of the county” (Ross v. Goshi 1972). The penalty for putting up a sign, 
which was not permitted, was $500 per day until the sign was removed {Ross v. 
Goshi 1972).
When it was originally passed in 1961, Section 3(a)(4) allowed political 
signs that were no larger than eighteen square feet to be posted for sixty days 
prior to and ten days following an election {Ross v. Goshi 1972). The 
amendment to the section was passed in 1971 and it had the effect of banning 
all political campaign signs at all times {Ross v. Goshi 1972). Section 8 of Maui
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County Ordinance, while prohibiting certain kinds of signs, including political 
campaign signs, did allow for the display of various types of commercial signs 
(Ross v. Goshi 1972). The distinction, according to the court, was that political 
signs were prohibited and other signs were permitted simply due to the message 
appearing on the face of the sign (Ross v. Goshi 1972).
Several cases have been decided in which certain reasonable regulations 
placed on the posting of outdoor signs were deemed permissible when the 
regulation was found to serve some “significant governmental interest” (Ross v. 
Goshi 1972). Any types of restrictions that come close to infringing upon First 
Amendment freedoms are subject to careful scrutiny by the courts (Ross v. Goshi 
1972).
Maui county officials needed to show that the restriction against posting 
political campaign signs had some “rational relationship to the effectuation of 
a proper governmental purpose,” and that it was necessary in order to promote 
a “compelling state interest,” as was stated in the case of Peltz v. City o f South 
Euclid (Ross v. Goshi 1972). There could be no compelling state interest in a 
regulation when lesser means were available to achieve the same purpose (Ross 
v. Goshi 1972).
In Ross, the defendants were unable to show that political signs that were 
reasonable in “size, structure, appearance and placement” created a safety hazard 
or tarnished the aesthetic beauty of Maui County in a way that was different
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from the various types of commercial signs that were permitted (Ross v. Goshi 
1972). The defendants relayed to the court that, as it was originally enacted, 
Maui County Ordinance 308 did warrant some sort of regulation because of the 
multitude of signs permitted (Ross v. Goshi 1972). However, the court stated 
that the amendment to the ordinance that prohibited all political campaign signs 
was an overreaction, as a lesser measure could have been employed to regulate 
the signs instead of getting rid of them altogether (Ross v. Goshi 1972). In Peltz 
v. City o f South Euclid, the Ohio Supreme Court held that a “municipality is not 
powerless” to create reasonable regulations against the nuisances that may be 
caused by political signs, but that public officials may not take steps to prohibit 
all campaign signs (Ross v. Goshi 1972).
The Ross court deemed that Maui County Ordinance 697 was unconstitu­
tional in that it infringed on the plaintiffs’ constitutionally protected freedom 
of speech and equal protection under the law (Ross v. Goshi 1972). In 
overturning ordinance 697, Section 3(a)(4) was left as it was originally enacted 
where it allowed political signs of certain sizes to be posted for set durations of 
time prior to and following an election (Ross v. Goshi 1972). In deciding 
whether or not the original ordinance was constitutional, the court found that 
the restrictions imposed by the ordinance were a permissible form of balancing 
the constitutional rights of the candidates against all other governmental
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interests (.Ross v. Goshi 1972). Thus, Maui County Ordinance 308 as originally 
set forth was reinstituted (Ross v. Goshi 1972).
Three additional cases are worthy of note for the fact that their election 
sign limitation ordinances each proved to be in violation of the First Amend­
ment.
In Van v. Oregon Travel Information Council, an Oregon statute that
prohibited the posting of signs at all times—except for a period of sixty days
prior to a general election—on land that was adjacent to federal highways was
found to be a violation of the First Amendment by the Oregon Court of
Appeals (Van v. Oregon Travel Information Council 1981). The act, which
limited the erecting of temporary political signs, was promulgated by the
Oregon Travel Information Council (Van v. Oregon Travel Information Council
1981). The stated purpose of the act was to,
. . . promote the public safety, to preserve the recreational value of 
public travel on state highways, and to preserve the natural beauty and 
aesthetic features of such highways and adjacent areas (Van v. Oregon 
Travel Information Council 1981).
The court found that the aesthetic interests seeking to be advanced by 
the state through the passage of the ordinance were legitimate, but that it was 
difficult to determine a relationship between the sixty-day limitation on the 
posting of political signs, and matters relating to public safety—permitting 
political signs on a temporary basis made it hard to imagine how prohibiting
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such signs at other times significantly promotes highway safety (Van v. Oregon
Travel Information Council 1981). According to the court,
Limiting the time period during which the political signs may be 
maintained is more closely related to considerations of aesthetics and 
preservation of the recreational value of Oregon’s highways, but these 
interests, although valid, are not sufficient to justify this significant 
restriction on political speech (Van v. Oregon Travel Information Council 
1981).
The court went further to note that the entire process of acquainting the 
public with new candidates is a slow one (Van v. Oregon Travel Information 
Council 1981). Oregon’s election scheme inherently intensifies this process, as 
its primary elections are held during the month of May, with the general 
elections occurring in November, nearly six months later (Van v. Oregon Travel 
Information Council 1981). Thus, the sixty-day political sign limitation was 
even more unreasonable in hampering political speech (Van v. Oregon Travel 
Information Council 1981).
Yet another such case that had the effect of infringing upon the 
guarantees of political speech was Carollo v. Miami (Carollo v. Miami 1984). In 
1984, the Florida Circuit Court struck down a Miami ordinance that required 
a permit and the payment of a fee to post any temporary campaign sign that 
measured over fifteen square feet on privately-owned commercial property 
(Carollo v. Miami 1984).
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The plaintiff in this case, Carollo, was a candidate running for reelection 
for his seat on the city commission (Carollo v. Miami 1984). Carollo posted an 
estimated 75% of his 225 campaign signs on private property (Carollo v. Miami 
1984). His signs measured 32 square feet (Carollo v. Miami 1984). Carollo did 
not apply for or obtain a permit, nor did he pay any fees for the posting of his 
signs (Carollo v. Miami 1984). He was able to secure a temporary restraining 
order to prohibit the enforcement of the ordinance and challenged the 
provisions of the ordinance that banned temporary campaign signs on private 
property without the required permit along with the payment of a minimum 
fifteen dollar fee for all signs exceeding fifteen square feet in size (Carollo v. 
Miami 1984).
According to the court, Miami’s temporary sign ordinance inhibited the 
use of political signs by imposing permit and fee requirements (Carollo v. Miami 
1984). The court applied a balancing test pitting the First Amendment 
guarantees against the legitimate governmental interest seeking to be furthered 
(Carollo v. Miami 1984). The court noted that the same permit application form 
was used for all signs, whether they were commercial, decorative, political, or 
otherwise (Carollo v. Miami 1984). A permit application was to be filed and a 
fee paid for each and every regulated sign, even if all the signs were identical 
(Carollo v. Miami 1984). Carollo’s permit fees for his campaign signs would
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have amounted to $2,500, an unnecessary burden, according to the court 
(Carollo v. Miami 1984).
The circuit court stated that the equal protection clause of the Four­
teenth Amendment requires that any statute that affects First Amendment 
freedoms be narrowly drawn to meet the state’s objectives, and not based on a 
classification method that is discriminatory (Carollo v. Miami 1984). Section 
2025.3 of the act allowed for the establishment of exemptions to the permit 
requirements (Carollo v. Miami 1984). Signs displayed on vehicles, for example, 
served to illustrate the ordinance’s discriminatory propensity (Carollo v. Miami 
1984). A political sign that exceeded two hundred square feet would be 
permissible on privately-owned commercial property without need of a permit 
or permit fee if the sign were attached to a truck or another vehicle parked on 
the property and if that vehicle could be used for normal transportation 
purposes (Carollo v. Miami 1984). The same two-hundred-square-foot sign 
posted on the same commercial property without having been mounted on a 
vehicle would require the payment of an eighty-dollar permit fee (Carollo v. 
Miami 1984).
The court concluded that the distinctions and classifications created by 
such exemptions were both arbitrary and discriminatory because they favored 
nonpolitical over political speech (Carollo v. Miami 1984). The city’s claim that 
the ordinance was passed for means of aesthetics, safety, and the ensured
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removal of the signs after the election did not bear a “substantial relationship”
to the protection of such interests by imposing permits and fees (Carollo v.
Miami 1984). The court held that,
Miami has not sufficiently tailored its regulation of temporary campaign 
signs to avoid arbitrary interference with the free exercise of fundamental 
First Amendment rights (Carollo v. Miami 1984).
Finally, the case o f Arlington County Republican Committee v. Arlington
County involved a challenge to a zoning ordinance that restricted the placement
of political signs on private property to no more than two such signs (.Arlington
County Republican Committee v. Arlington County 1993). The plaintiffs argued
that the challenged provision violated their First Amendment guarantee of
freedom of speech as the two sign limit prevented both political parties and
individual homeowners from expressing their political views (Arlington County
Republican Committee v. Arlington County 1993).
The defendants expressed their belief that the ordinance furthered the
county’s substantial interest in promoting aesthetics and traffic safety (Arlington
County Republican Committee v. Arlington County 1993). The Arlington
County Republican Committee countered this viewpoint by providing evidence
showing the lack of any specific aesthetic or traffic safety problems during the
period of time in which a preliminary injunction prohibiting the enforcement
of the ordinance was in effect (Arlington County Republican Committee v.
Arlington County 1993). Thus, the political committee charged that the county
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failed to narrowly tailor its ordinance to further its stated interest (.Arlington 
County Republican Committee v. Arlington Country 1993). The United States 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the Committee in that the two- 
sign limitation was an infringement on political speech violating the First 
Amendment, as it did not serve to further the state’s aesthetic and public safety 
interests (Arlington County Republican Committee v. Arlington County 1993).
Sponsorship Identification 
Politicians seeking Federal office are subject to regulations that can 
greatly differ from those that regulate state and local elections. The case of U.S. 
v. Scott illustrated the importance of proper sponsorship information appearing 
on campaign materials (U.S. v. Scott 1961). The case involved the alleged 
violation of a statute that prohibited the publication of a piece of campaign 
literature for a candidate who sought the office of United States Senator, when 
the name of the sponsor of the literature—in this case, a campaign brochure— 
was not disclosed anywhere on the literature (U.S. v. Scott 1961). The defendant 
argued that the sponsorship disclosure requirement infringed on his First 
Amendment rights, and he moved for dismissal of the charges against him that 
he violated Section 612 of Title 18 of the United States Code (U.S. v. Scott 
1961).
Section 612 of the Code states that it is unlawful for an individual or 
group to knowingly publish and distribute any campaign material on behalf of
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a candidate for Federal office without declaring the name of the sponsor or 
sponsors of the published piece (U.S. v. Scott 1961). The penalty for violating 
the section is a fine of up to $1,000, a year in prison, or both (U.S. v. Scott 
1961).
After senatorial candidate Quentin Burdick had declared his intention to 
seek the office of Senator from N orth Dakota prior to June of 1960, Scott, 
during the month of June 1960, published and distributed copies of a pamphlet 
concerning Quentin Burdick titled, "Is this smear, or are they fact?" without 
including any of the identities of the individuals responsible for producing the 
pamphlet (U.S. v. Scott 1961).
The defendant stated that the charges brought against him violated his 
First Amendment rights because, as a farmer, he was subject to a myriad of 
Federal governmental regulatory interferences (U.S. v. Scott 1961). Scott stated 
that each crop that he grew had certain guidelines that were set and determined 
by Federal agencies and that, if he were to disclose his name on the campaign 
literature, he would be subject to future retaliation by Federal officials (U.S. v. 
Scott 1961).
Congress intended for the identities of the individuals producing 
campaign literature to be disclosed so that the voters could be informed and 
could make a decision about a particular candidate knowing by whom they had 
been supported or opposed (US. v. Scott 1961). The N orth Dakota U.S. District
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Court stated that the defendant’s theory of potential future “reprisal is highly 
speculative and conjectural” (U.S. v. Scott 1961). According to the court, the 
mere possibility of retaliation is not sufficient enough to permit one from 
following the prescribed sponsorship identification requirement (U.S. v. Scott 
1961). The apparent value of Section 612 of the Code to the public outweighed 
the alleged infringement of the defendant’s rights (U.S. v. Scott 1961). The court 
held that Section 612 is a valid exercise of legislative power in the national 
interest and that “scurrilous” publications by unknown authors are an “evil 
which the Congress has seen fit to proscribe within the ambit of Section 612” 
(U.S. v. Scott 1961).
The issue of sponsor identification on published political advertisements 
was the focus of the case Kansas v. Davis. The Kansas District Court in 
Jefferson County ruled, in September of 1991, which a Kansas statute that 
proscribed criminal penalties against those who publish political advertisements 
without any form of sponsorship identification is overly-broad (Kansas v. Davis 
1991).
The state held that the newspaper defendants published a display 
advertisement for a third party—one who took a position on an upcoming jail 
bond election—which was in violation of Kansas Statute 25-2407 because the 
advertisement ran without “attribution,” in that it contained no wording to 
identify the sponsor of the advertisement (Kansas v. Davis 1991). Statute 25-
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2407 was referred to as Kansas’ “corrupt political advertising statute” (Kansas v. 
Davis 1991). It stated, in essence, that when publishing or broadcasting a print 
advertisement or a broadcast commercial that is intended to advocate one 
political position over another, then the name of the chairman of the sponsoring 
organization or political committee must be disclosed (.Kansas v. Davis 1991). 
A violation of the statute constituted a misdemeanor (Kansas v. Davis 1991).
The newspaper defendants charged that the Kansas statute was unconsti­
tutionally overbroad as it applied to “issue-oriented” speech, which is protected 
by the First Amendment (Kansas v. Davis 1991). The court was in agreement 
with the defendants and declared that the Kansas statute was unconstitutionally 
overbroad (Kansas v. Davis 1991). The court stated that the statute’s attribution 
requirement, as it related to candidate-oriented speech, was not a violation of the 
First Amendment, but the goal of complete disclosure was not met by the 
statute (Kansas v. Davis 1991). The court also held that while the anonymous 
criticism of government is protected, the anonymous criticism of candidates for 
public office may lead to an abuse of the electoral process (Kansas v. Davis 
1991). This notion, in turn, leads to the necessity of “substantiating the state 
interest” in order to justify a “limited impediment” on one’s First Amendment 
rights (Kansas v. Davis 1991).
Along similar lines, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in June 
of 1975, declared unconstitutional a criminal statute prohibiting any person
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from writing, printing, posting, or distributing election circulars or posters 
unless there appeared “conspicuously” on the publications the names of the 
officers of the organization that issued it, “or of some voter who is responsible 
therefore” {Communications Law 1975). The court, in Commonwealth v. Dennis, 
found the statute to either “impose . . .  an unconstitutional prior restraint on 
a nonvoter’s exercise of First Amendment rights” or, if construed to be 
inapplicable to nonvoters, to establish an unconstitutionally irrational 




It has been said that the new FCC rules are “an effort to bring order and 
chaos out of the FCC’s existing political broadcasting enforcement, which has 
evolved over the years and confounded FCC officials, broadcasters, and 
candidates alike” (Jessell 34). Perhaps the jury is still out with regard to how 
effective the new FCC political advertising reforms will be. In my opinion, 
many of the complaints that were discussed earlier in Chapter Two are quite 
valid.
In terms of the audio sponsorship identification requirement, the fact 
that precious seconds are used up—often approximately 20% of a thirty-second 
spot—makes one wonder if the FCC should be forcing candidates to buy the 
thirty-second spots when they could be requiring stations to sell candidates 
twenty-four-second spots instead. If the stipulation does, in fact, lead to the 
virtual demise of the shorter ten- and fifteen-second spots for political 
candidates, only those candidates with the war chests to purchase the longer-
89
90
duration spots will be able to access this form of the media. The main intention 
behind the video and audio sponsorship requirements was so that both hearing- 
and visually-impaired voters could discover on whose behalf the political 
advertisement was aired. However, if only the more wealthy candidates are the 
ones who will be able to afford the longer spots, then all voters are put at a 
disadvantage because they will not be afforded the exposure to as many of the 
candidates as would otherwise be possible.
The argument expressed by the broadcasters regarding the responsibility 
that they were given to make sure that political spots contain the proper 
sponsorship identification is also justifiable. It should be the candidate or the 
candidate’s campaign management team who is ultimately responsible for 
improper sponsorship identification. However, the way the policy was enacted 
requires that the station has the obligation to make sure that all political spots 
conform to the FCC regulations and, if they do not, that the station is 
responsible for making sure that the spots are repaired in order to meet the 
prescribed format. The broadcaster is not expected to do the revisions free of 
charge to the candidate, but if a spot were ever aired without the proper 
identification and it were discovered as such, the station would be liable and 
would face possible sanctions by the FCC. The broadcaster is responsible for 
making sure that hundreds of political spots meet the FCC regulations, and it 
is not outside the realm of probability that one advertisement may get
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overlooked, especially in those situations when the candidate does not allow the 
spot to be previewed by the station. A better approach would be to pass the 
liability problem down to the candidate. This responsibility could be assumed 
in the form of a waiver that the station should require the candidate to sign 
attesting to the fact that the sponsorship identification requirement has been met 
and, if it is learned that it has not, the candidate and not the station will assume 
responsibility for any sanctions levied by the FCC.
On a more positive side, the political file requirement that the broadcast­
ers must fulfill is very admirable. This provides complete candidate spot 
scheduling disclosure to anyone requesting information at the station. The 
station is responsible for providing a log that lists each individual who requests 
information on a given candidate, and exactly what information has been 
requested. The station is allowed to make copies of the information for the 
inquisitor. W ith such a log of those who have sought access to the files, both 
the candidate and his opponents benefit. The candidate can discover who 
requested information on his advertising plans, and the opponents can use the 
information to strategize exactly when and how much they choose to spend on 
radio and television advertising. However, to be truly fair, it is essential that 
the files and logs are maintained according to the established FCC requirements.
Of the cases discussed, the case of Gore Newspapers Company v. Shevin 
was perhaps the most interesting, holding that candidates should not be given
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the lowest local advertising rate. Obviously, this perspective is long a thing of 
the past as the FCC itself requires that the media provide political candidates 
the lowest rates possible during the campaign period. The reasoning of the U.S. 
District Court of Florida was interesting because, while it seems that the justices 
were in agreement with the Florida legislature that these lesser rates should be 
allowed, they reversed this train of thought and held the provision unconstitu­
tional. Their seemingly weak rationale was based on the fact that the First 
Amendment protects against a prior restraint by the government that, in this 
case, dealt with the lessening of newspaper advertising revenues.
Overall, the cases discussed in this paper appear to be a sound 
representation of the types of cases at the Federal and state level that have dealt 
with political advertising. While it is clear that legislatures are not restricted 
from placing regulations on issues that have an effect on political campaigns, it 
is also equally clear that when these restrictions come particularly close to 
infringing upon an individual’s First Amendment rights, the courts, as a whole, 
will see fit to impose a rigorous test upon the restrictions to make certain that 
the governmental interest allowed by the restriction is crucial enough to allow 
these encroachments upon constitutional freedoms.
The cases that focused on regulations imposed upon the posting of 
political signs, for instance, are good examples of the court system’s desire to 
protect the citizens’ constitutional rights and to take into account the fact that
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local governments in particular may have a valid reason for trying to impose 
posting regulations. The courts, in general, held that as long as the govern­
ment’s aesthetic and public safety reasons were found to be truly served by an 
ordinance, then the regulation was found to be a permissible constitutional 
limitation. Any slight infringement on the candidate’s ability to speak to the 
voters, which would hamper the public’s right to be informed, was likely to be 
deemed unconstitutional by the courts.
The new reforms proposed by the Federal Communications Commission 
will have a definite effect upon political advertising in the years to come. Only 
time will tell if, as the FCC had originally intended, the citizens prove to be the 
real beneficiaries of this increased level of voter information. Indeed, today’s 
political environment is not what it once was. Those candidates with high 
ideals of changing the world for the better will not get very far if they do not 
possess the ability to get their distinctive message to the voters. The use of 
television and radio, especially in large markets and in statewide races, is 
invaluable if the candidate wants a reasonable chance of attaining office. 
However, the constitutional right to exercise one’s freedom of political speech 
is not immune from encroachment by the regulatory agencies or the judiciary. 
It seems, then, that we Americans are at the mercy of these varied entities to 




If, for a moment, we take a step back from the intricacies of all the 
enactments and regulations imposed on political advertising—taking a longer, 
broader, more macroscopic view of both the intent and the demonstrated 
practice of the process of political advertising—the immediate question that 
arises is this: Have the many and various enactments and court decisions 
actually been effective in “leveling the political playing field” by making it more 
accessible to a wider spectrum of candidates?
It can be argued that they have not.
The political process is no more accessible simply because a candidate 
with greater financial resources still has the ability to “overpower” the less 
well-financed candidate in the advertising arena, and it is in this arena, 
regrettably—an arena not of issues and clear debate, but one of advertising 
power, manipulation, and acumen—that elections are so overwhelmingly often 
decided.
An example that illustrates this point: Candidate A and Candidate B are 
running against one another for political office. Candidate A is heavily- 
financed, while Candidate B has considerably less money in her campaign 
account. Both candidates will use various means of political advertising to get 
what they hope to be their “distinctive” messages across to the voters.
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The regulations on political advertising will affect each candidate equally, 
but because Candidate A has the funds to more effectively saturate the political 
terrain with his message, he finds himself at a distinct advantage over Candidate
B. Regulations such as the lowest-unit-charge provision will do little to aid a 
candidate who is unable to match another candidate’s spending levels. One 
thousand gross rating points will beat one hundred gross rating points almost 
every time.
Ironically, the lowest-unit-charge provision—instituted to assist candidates 
such as Candidate B above—is actually a boon to Candidate A, the highly- 
funded candidate. The provision lowers air time costs universally, allowing his 
already abundant funds to go even further, to buy even more.
Furthermore, one should also never lose sight of the fact that the 
legislative bodies—and the individual members of those bodies—who craft the 
regulatory measures are quite mindful that, come reelection time, they, too, will 
be bound by any new restrictions and/or regulations they enact. In other 
words, as they consider possible election reform laws and regulations, they are 
well aware they are determining the rules they will themselves have to follow 
to keep their jobs as elected legislators. This is a situation in which the 
incumbent can have a distinct advantage.
For example, an incumbent may find a double benefit in being a part of 
limiting the extent and duration of political signage. O n the one hand, he can
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“grandstand” to his constituents about how he helped “rid our neighborhoods 
of the ‘litter’ of political signs,” while on the other hand he knows that, as the 
incumbent, he does not so badly need the simple awareness such signs provide 
the electorate for a challenger.
Another troubling point concerning political advertising is that executive 
branch agencies, such as the FCC, regulate in a venue that is essentially closed 
to the voter. The average citizen cannot write to his or her “local” FCC 
commissioner to  urge him to support certain regulations over others because 
there is no “local” FCC commissioner. In fact, no part of the FCC is directly 
accountable to the voting public. If the average citizen communicates on such 
matters at all, it will most likely be with his or her elected representatives.
Day-to-day enforcement—or lack of enforcement—of enacted political 
advertising regulations takes place in an arena virtually inaccessible to those 
whom it most profoundly affects. Only those individuals who are avid and 
knowledgeable observers of the intricacies of the political process—an extremely 
small proportion of the total electorate—will be privy to how legislation is being 
regulated.
Perhaps the only real way the public can effectively voice their opinions 
on matters that will truly affect how political advertising is regulated and, 
therefore, is presented to them is, ironically, by exercising their right to vote. 
The electorate must express its support for candidates who will not merely
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devise hollow legislation that provides candidates the opportunities to 
“grandstand.” They must back candidates who seriously want to make the 
electoral process an equitable one for all who wish to enter politics and serve 
their constituents. That, ultimately, is not the responsibility of the FCC or of 
Federal, state, or local politicians. It is the responsibility—and the choice—of 
each individual voter.
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